Nuclear Waste and Predictions of Things to Come
Nuclear Waste and Predictions of Things to Come
Think you can predict what might happen in 4.5 billion years or even a mere 24,000 years from now?
If you are of sound mind, your answer would likely be, “of course not.”
Yet, there are those in our midst who are paid to convince us (with a straight face), that it is safe to permanently bury, in deep underground repositories, highly radioactive and toxic nuclear fuel wastes. Some of these substances will be dangerous to living organisms for unimaginable and incomprehensible spans of time. Worse yet, these folks are actively pursuing the development and construction of such monstrosities.
Can a human-made underground nuclear waste repository completely isolate and contain long-lived radioactive poisons for the time required to render them inert and harmless? Any one who says it can, needs a period of serious reflection.
Consider Plutonium 239, one of the components of irradiated nuclear fuel waste, with a “half-life” of 24,000 years. (meaning one half will have decayed in that period of time, but the remainder will continue to be as radioactive and as toxic as it was when it was removed from the reactor).
Try to contemplate those staggering periods of time. Think about the changes in the earth that have occurred over the same eons of time in the past. Speculate over the possible kinds of geological changes which could occur in the future. And, finally, think about the damage to health and safety that these radioactive and toxic substances can do when they come into contact with the external environment.
Consider the human populations which might be nearby when these invisible radioactive substances inevitably work their way out of the repository and into the surrounding land, water, and air.
If our far future descendants should be unlucky enough to inhale airborne Plutonium particles, which remain radioactive in the body, and highly damaging to the lungs and other human organs, the onset of lung cancer is a distinct possibility.
Or, if iodine-129 (half-life of 17 million years) escapes from the repository and is ingested from milk, fruits and vegetables, the primary health risk is thyroid cancer.
And so on.
Why, you might ask, would anyone even consider creating underground nuclear waste garbage dumps? Why would they even take the risk of sticking it to their own descendents? Why are they not pursuing a truly scientific way of dealing with these substances?
Very good questions. Perhaps the answer is as simple as the fact that we humans are pretty adept at fouling our own nest and that we always take the easy way out. But, actually, it is far more complicated then that.
In 2011, the ongoing nuclear meltdown at Fukushima, Japan, is definitely putting a crimp in the major expansion plans of the world’s nuclear establishment. Its efforts to create a world-wide nuclear energy “renaissance” has become increasingly elusive. But even prior to the accidents at Fukushima, Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, the public was already leery about the concept of permanent underground burial of nuclear reactor waste.
As the nuclear waste inventories continue to increase at the reactor sites, the industry continues to pursue its “out of site, out of mind” underground burial approach. The nuclear advocates, including many a duped politician, believe that if they can convince us that burial is the ultimate solution to the waste problem, then, it hopes, there will be greater public acceptance of more nuclear energy. But, how they can do this in the face of the Fukushima tragedy and the likelihood of accidents and terrorist attacks in an increasingly unstable world, is beyond me.
In the United States, construction of a major repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, was finally terminated by the Obama Administration. After a fortune was spent on site exploration, it was deemed to be geologically unsuitable, e.g. surface water intrusion, seismic activity. A “Blue Ribbon” Commission was established to study the issue, and with the usual lack of imagination, concluded that the underground burial method should proceed, hopefully hosted by volunteer communities.
In Canada, during the early 1980’s, efforts by the Crown Corporation, Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. (AECL) to locate suitable sites in Cambrian Shield granite rock formations, were thwarted by objections from nearby communities. Later, the underground burial idea was put on hold after a lengthy Federal Environmental Assessment Review Process.
The current Canadian effort is under the aegis of the nuclear industry dominated Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO). It is currently undertaking a new site selection effort and is handing out large sums of money to some relatively remote communities in north Saskatchewan and Northwest Ontario, for “educational” purposes.
The one thing the nuclear establishment has in its favor these days, is a terrible world economy. Some misguided populations may actually sell their souls to the devil.
I think it is rather revealing that searches for nuclear waste repository sites always seem to concentrate on small, often remote communities. During the initial 1985 U.S. repository siting process, I recall a memorable statement by then Vermont’s tough-minded Governor, Madeleine Kunin. In a letter to John Herrington, then US Energy Secretary, she challenged his search for a repository site in Vermont's granite rock. She expressed the main concern of many people when she stated that the US nuclear waste siting program contained criteria which targeted sparsely populated and rural areas.
In no uncertain terms, the Governor told the Energy Secretary ". . . (that) "I firmly believe that if the facility isn't foolproof it must not be built. If it is, it can be located anywhere."
Governor Kunin put her finger on one of the most flagrant contradictions in nuclear waste management programs and certainly one that seems to be operating in Canada now. On the one hand, the public is told by the nuclear establishment that underground "disposal" is safe. But on the other hand, their efforts for research and siting all seem to concentrate on low population areas. As the Governor said, if it really is safe, and foolproof, ". . . it can be located anywhere." Of course she was right. Why not big cities and metropolitan areas
I strongly believe that the day will come when science, not politics and commercial interests, will solve the nuclear waste problem. Science created these radioactive substances, and science will transmute them to inert, harmless, substances. The technology is already on the drawing board.
Walt Robbins
September, 2011
Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga
Comments on the proposal to build nuclear reactors at Darlington February 18, 2011
The proponent has given me no reason to believe that the objective of producing 4500 megawatts from new nuclear reactors at Darlington cannot be met over the same, or shorter, time frame and for less cost from the accelerated development of alternative renewable sources of energy and from significant conservation efforts. With the political will, Ontario should be able to produce at least that much electrical energy from green alternatives and conservation rather than from highly polluting sources such as nuclear and coal. Especially, since the construction of a full-scale nuclear power reactor can take as much as a decade or more to complete.
However, let’s do it right. What Ontario needs is a serious, comprehensive and unbiased comparative analysis which includes projections of the full range of benefits and costs of new nuclear construction vs. those from a realistic spectrum of green energy sources and conservation.
Without such a study, any conclusions drawn regarding the efficacy of proceeding with a highly centralized, extremely expensive nuclear option at this point would be meaningless and could do a great disservice to the people of Ontario.
It should be noted that a recently released study (January 27, 2011) by Mark Jacobson and Mark Delucchi of Stanford University concludes that the world can be electrically powered by alternative energy from wind, water and sunlight within 20 to 40 years. Nuclear energy is ruled out as an option particularly on the basis of potential terrorism threats, weapons proliferation, carbon emissions, and radioactive waste issues.
Significant developments in alternative energy are underway which must not be brushed aside and ignored within the narrow boundaries of a typical environmental assessment process on one particular mode of energy.
It should also be noted that the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Energy Agency-backed Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21) project, declared that, for the second year in a row, the quantity of “newly installed capacity” of renewable energy in Europe and the U.S. outpaced that for fossil fuels and nuclear. The report suggests the same outcome is likely on a global basis this year.
The ongoing Darlington environmental assessment must be amended to encompass a comparative analysis which also includes the negative features and consequences of nuclear energy, (many of which are frequently overlooked).
As a reminder, following is a summary of some of those “down-sides:”
.Nuclear energy is responsible for the release of large quantities of greenhouse gasses and other noxious emissions
According to a December 14, 2006 report by the Pembina Institute, no other energy source combines the generation of as wide a range of conventional pollutants and waste streams-including heavy metals, smog-and acid-rain precursors and greenhouse gases. It notes that "...total greenhouse gas emissions associated with uranium mining, milling, refining, conversion and fuel fabrication in Canada are estimated at between 240,000 and 366,000 tonnes of CO2 per year."
.Harmful emissions from the nuclear industry will continue to increase as supplies of rich uranium ore decrease
According to scientists Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen and Philip Bartlett Smith, "...at the present rate of use, worldwide supplies of rich uranium ore will soon become exhausted, perhaps within the next decade. Nuclear power stations of the future will have to rely on second-grade ore, which requires huge amounts of conventional energy to refine it. For each ton of poor-quality uranium, some 5000 tons of granite that contain it will have to be mined, milled and then disposed of. This could rise to 10,000 tons if the quality deteriorates further. At some point, and it could happen soon, the nuclear industry will be emitting as much carbon dioxide from mining and treating its ore as it saves from the so-called clean power it produces thanks to nuclear fission." The researchers estimate that "The use of nuclear power causes, at the end of the road and under the most favourable conditions, approximately one-third as much carbon dioxide emission as gas-fired electricity production."
.Nuclear power production could well go into energy deficit as rich Uranium ore quantities are consumed
According to energy writer David Fleming in Prospect magazine on the subject of rich ore depletion, "...it (nuclear) would be putting more energy into the process than it could extract from it. Its contribution to meeting the world's energy needs would become negative! The so-called reliability of nuclear power, which its proponents enthuse over, would therefore rest on the growing use of fossil fuels rather than their replacement."
In my view, Fleming’s comments translate into more and larger dangerous uranium tailing ponds with all of their health and safety issues. The Stop Darlington coalition says “there are currently over 200 million tonnes of uranium tailings in Ontario and Saskatchewan. This waste remains a hazard for thousands of years and contains carcinogens, such as radium, radon gas, and thorium among others.”
.Nuclear reactors routinely emit other noxious substances, one of the worst of which is radioactive tritium into the environment
According to Dr. Gordon Edwards of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, "Tritium poses an ever-present radiological hazard to CANDU (reactor) workers. It is also an environmental contaminant which pollutes the drinking water of many communities situated near CANDU reactors. In addition, atmospheric emissions of tritium are readily inhaled - and also absorbed directly through the skin - by residents living near CANDU reactors."
.Nuclear reactors can have an adverse impact on surrounding bodies of water, such as the Great Lakes
According to Lake Ontario Waterkeeper, the lake has a “fragile” ecosystem. Since millions of people depend on this lake for basic physiological needs, it is my view that the plan to place additional large-scale nuclear reactors on the lake could enhance that fragility and is, therefore, a highly questionable undertaking.
.New nuclear reactor design problems can delay or even terminate large scale, expensive projects
One example of this phenomenon in which I was personally involved, can be found in Atomic Energy of Canada’s failed effort to develop a promised 10 mw Slowpoke reactor, even while attempting to market it in Canada and abroad. The 2 mw pilot version at the Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment in Manitoba was finally shut down as it failed to reach its full capacity.
Many concerns have been expressed about the technical problems associated with the so-called “new generation” of large nuclear reactors.
.The Canadian taxpayer is footing much of the bill and incurring much of the national debt, for Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd's (AECL's) nuclear expansion. The economics of nuclear energy are not sustainable
According to a 2006 Energy Probe study, federal subsidies to AECL since its inception in 1952 amounted to $74.9 billion of Federal Government debt (about 12 per cent of the entire outstanding amount).
According to Shawn-Patrick Stensil, Greenpeace nuclear analyst. “Ontario consumers spent nearly $2 billion (in 2009) on their electricity bills to pay down the debt from building reactors in the 1970s...” This “debt retirement charge” continues to appear on Hydro One billings.
Significant cost overruns are not confined to CANDU reactor nuclear power development in Ontario. A current case in point is the development and construction of the Olkiluoto reactor in Finland by the French based AREVA company. According to Stephen Thomas, professor of energy policy at the University of Greenwich, "Olkiluoto has become an example of all that can go wrong in economic terms with new reactors.” Areva and the utility involved "...are in bitter dispute over who will bear the cost overruns and there is a real risk now that the utility will default"
According to the Stop Darlington coalition “This (Darlington) plan will divert billions of dollars that should be invested in cheaper and cleaner green energy sources. Expanding our use of green energy to replace Darlington would create thousands of decentralized jobs, save rate-payers money and end the production of radioactive waste.”
According to the Ontario Clean Air Alliance (OCAA), energy conservation and efficiency per-kilowatt-hour costs from 2.3 to 4.6 cents, while the re-build of Darlington would be as high as 19 to 37 cents. OCAA also points out that “... every single nuclear project in Ontario’s history has gone over budget and the actual costs of Ontario’s nuclear projects have been 2.5 times greater than the original cost estimates.”
According to John Parsons, director of the energy and environment program at the MIT Sloan School of Management, nuclear is increasingly seen as uncompetitive with natural-gas-fired plants as gas prices fall and global construction costs soar. In 2009, MIT doubled its forecasted construction costs of new nuclear plants, while the U.S. Energy Information Administration increased its 2009 estimate by 37 per cent just this past December.
.No publicly acceptable solution for the permanent disposition of irradiated reactor fuel waste as yet exists in Canada
According to the Canadian federal environmental assessment panel (Seaborn) report released in March, 1998 after an eight year intensive public process "... the (AECL) concept in its current form for deep geologic disposal does not have broad public support, and does not have the required level of acceptability to be adopted as Canada's approach for managing nuclear fuel wastes."
.Canada's nuclear industry-based Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO,) in November, 2005, after a three year study, continued to endorse the permanent underground burial of irradiated nuclear fuel wastes
According to Elizabeth May, former Executive Director of the Sierra Club of Canada and currently leader of the Green Party of Canada, "...the NWMO has taken its mandate and skewed it to allow them to make decisions that are industry-biased, and not based on health, safety and security measures."
.If all of Canada's current nuclear waste is transported to a centralized location for storage or permanent burial, shipments by rail, highway and waterway, would be continuous, and over many years, possibly decades
According to Nuclear Waste Watch, (a network of thirty environmental, social and other groups across Canada) "the potential recipient and transport route communities should all have veto power, and should receive funding from proponents for independent research and community education."
Concerns expressed by many groups opposed to nuclear waste transportation include property value losses along the transportation corridor, the routine radiation exposure during handling and transit, worst case scenario radiation exposure, health and environmental costs, and more potential for accidents and terrorist acts resulting from greater shipment frequency and duration of shipments.
The proposal to build reactors at Darlington will obviously add considerably to the potential for transportation risks
.No safe level of ionizing radiation exists
According to a 2005 report of a US National Academy of Sciences panel (Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation-BEIR VII), investigating the dangers of low energy, low-dose ionizing radiation, "..it is unlikely that a threshold exists for the induction of cancers... Further, there are extensive data on radiation-induced transmissible mutations in mice and other organisms. There is therefore no reason to believe that humans would be immune to this sort of harm."
The nuclear industry frequently attempts to minimize the impact of low-dose radiation by a misleading comparison with natural “background” radiation.
In the early 1980's, the Government of Manitoba conducted scientific tests of background radiation found in many water wells in the eastern part of the province. As a result it was necessary to condemn many of these wells due to radiation readings in excess of the so-called “allowable” limits for clean drinking water health and safety.
It is possible that the lack of safe levels of low dose radiation results in an increase in various forms of cancer in areas surrounding nuclear reactors. For instance, in a 2008 study published in the European Journal of Cancer Care, it was reported that leukemia death rates in U.S. children near nuclear reactors rose sharply (vs. the national trend) in the past two decades.
.Terrorists could use nuclear reactors and nuclear waste as weapons of mass destruction and for the development of “dirty bombs.”
We live in increasingly dangerous times.
According to journalist Jeffrey St. Clair, shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., it was widely reported that al-Qaeda had given serious consideration to crashing commercial aircraft into several nuclear plants on that day. In his September 14, 2002 Counterpunch article (The Fire Next Time), he reports that al-Qaeda operatives Ramzi bin al-Shaibah and Khaled al-Sheikh Mohammad told Al-Jazeera interviewer Yosri Fouda, that future attacks on Western nuclear facilities could not be ruled out.
But the real Achille's heel at a nuclear plants is the adjacent spent fuel facility, which contains major concentrations of highly radioactive material. They lack the heavy duty containment safeguard provided for the reactor, and could be considered "sitting ducks" for disastrous terror attacks. Large explosions, along with major fire resulting in radioactive release from spent fuel would have serious health, social and economic consequences for people in the surrounding geographical area. It should be noted that many of our nuclear facilities are in close proximity to the Great Lakes. Any ecological disaster resulting from terrorism could affect water quality in both Canada and the United States.
As long as reactors are operating, much of their irradiated fuel waste must remain at the reactor sites in pools of water and/or dry casks for long periods of time, as they simply are too “hot” to handle–even if “out of sight-out of mind” central permanent storage facility were available.
The Darlington proposal would provide even more security concerns.
.More nuclear reactors can lead directly to greater nuclear weapons proliferation
According to Dr. Helen Caldicott, as a result of the projected so-called "...renaissance of the nuclear power industry, twenty-five countries and consortia will have access over a period of two decades to Generation IV reactors fueled by plutonium." In her book, Nuclear Power is Not the Answer, Dr. Caldicott reminds us that "Canada supplied India with a CIRUS heavy water reactor for making nuclear energy. . . It was this reactor that gave India the plutonium it used in its first 1974 nuclear weapons test."
One negative consequence often leads to another. A decade ago, few would have expected North Korea to have developed atomic weapons. What will a nuclear armed world look like a decade from now. Nuclear power is the ultimate conceiver of nuclear weapons.
The above outline covers some of the problems associated with the development and use of nuclear energy to produce electricity. This outline of nuclear energy down-sides is by no means complete. For example the woefully low insurance amounts for nuclear liability would not begin to cover the damages from large scale nuclear accidents; the contemplated use of irradiated fuel reprocessing in North America and the associated pollution issues that we have been witnessing in France and the U.K.
I am confident that green renewable energy and conservation can meet Ontario’s electrical energy requirements. However, I urge that a comparative analysis be undertaken which includes projections of the full range of benefits and costs of new nuclear construction and operation vs. those from a realistic spectrum of green energy sources and conservation, including possible hydro electricity import from neighboring provinces. In the meanwhile, all work on the Darlington projects should be stopped.
Many thanks for the opportunity to comment on this proposal.
Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga
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Siting an Underground Nuclear Waste Garbage Dump: Back to the Future, II
In my first “Back to the Future ” article, I pointed out that the so-called "Option 4 'Adaptive Phased Management' (APM)" program described in the Nuclear Waste Management Organization’s (NWMO’s) final report is little more than a dressed-up version of Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd’s (AECL’s) failed 1980's nuclear waste burial program.
In fact, both plans would ultimately yield the same end result: a sealed underground nuclear waste dump, some of its contents radioactive and lethal for eons of time.
Now, NWMO is going back to the future in its approach to selecting a site for a repository. Aside from using a lot of smooth talk, it is dangling big bucks as an enticement to municipalities and other groups.
A recent example is NWMO’s approach to aboriginal communities, something that was tried south of the border by the U.S. Department of Energy during the 1990's and failed miserably. In the end, all the first nations in the U.S. which were contacted, rejected the offer to host a surface monitored retrievable nuclear waste storage facility, turning down offers of millions of dollars for the “privilege.”
In November 2010, various Canadian media outlets revealed that the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) has received one million dollars from the NWMO to educate first nations people about nuclear waste and that two northern communities—the English River First Nation and the Métis village of Pinehouse—have come up as potential sites. And of course it is no secret that vastly larger sums of money would be made available to the “finalist” of the site selection process.
I was struck by the reported comments of Lyle Whitefish, FSIN vice-chief (in a November 18th 2010 article in the Saskatchewan News Network). While declaring neutrality on the issue, Whitefish said that “he and FSIN will not be providing any other information besides that coming from the Nuclear Waste Management Organization.” He was quoted as saying that “...there may be an opportunity in the future for other organizations to be heard on the nuclear waste issue.”
In a CBC News item online, November 18, 2010, Cathy Holtslander, of the Coalition for a Clean Green Saskatchewan, was reported as being concerned that the NWMO information would be biased. She said that "It needs to have independent information, not information from a group that has an interest in basically looking after their problem."
As a former member of the nuclear establishment, and having been involved with and written extensively on this issue for many years, I certainly believe that Ms. Hotslander raises an important point about sources of information. Perhaps the NWMO did not mention to Mr. Whitefish that throughout the world, nuclear waste management is one of the most controversial public policy issues of our time encompassing many different points of view. I can only hope that FSIN will agree to having other information and voices heard up front and right along side those of NWMO, an organization that is clearly an agent of the Canadian nuclear establishment.
NWMO has also been providing information to two interested communities in northwest Ontario; Ear Falls’ and Ignace . The information has been publically challenged by North Bay’s Northwatch organization, on grounds of “omissions and understatements.” Northwatch’s Brennain Lloyd cited NWMO informational deficiencies, including issues around long term repository reliability, storage container reliability, and the rejection of the earlier AECL burial concept after a ten year environmental assessment review. Ms. Lloyd also observed that “...no country has yet permanently disposed of nuclear fuel waste in rock...”
I commented on NWMO’s siting process in December, 2008, when it was in draft form and concluded that “Aside from the fact that a plan to permanently bury nuclear fuel waste is inherently immoral, unethical, unscientific, and downright mean-spirited to future generations, it is simply not a good idea.” Furthermore, I have a real problem with the dangling of large sums of money to entice communities into such a scheme.
In the final analysis, any community which supposedly “benefits” from this dubious activity, could very well be playing dice with the health and safety of its own descendants.
Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga
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Getting Rid of the Shaft? Maybe!
First, they tried to hide it’s location in the dense bush. Initially, they erected no signs. Then they said it was just in the planning stages, even as the bulldozers were at work moving the earth. Later, they said they were only doing nuclear waste research, even as they told the local municipal council that they would entertain a request for the siting of a full scale underground nuclear waste repository. The municipal council did not follow through as opposition continued to grow.
The underground research repository developed in the 1980's, in the Canadian province of Manitoba, in the Rural Municipality of Lac du Bonnet, by Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., (AECL) was officially decommissioned on November 17, 2010. Or so it seems!
“Getting the Shaft, The Radioactive Waste Controversy in Manitoba,” was released by Queenston House Publishing Company in 1984. It is my personal account of this incredible episode of nuclear madness, from early in 1980, to the present. As a property owner in the municipality, my role was that of a public relations and media spokesperson for the citizens group. My book, plus several sequels and related articles, are freely available on my web site; Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga
To a large extent, the waste project was propelled by the results of test bore hole drilling at the nearby Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment, at Pinawa, Manitoba. The pre-Cambrian granite rock of the Canadian Shield was deemed by the geological experts to be the ideal “host” environment for a deep nuclear waste repository. The special “plutonic” formations were considered to be “solid rock,” with few cracks or fissures.
The discovery of two major water bearing fracture zones during the excavations did not seem to faze the geologists in the least, even as pumps ran continuously to keep the water out of the massive hole in the rock. On my one visit to the underground facility, the place was soaking wet.
I spoke with George Ylonen about the decommissioned facility. As a resident of the municipality, a retired hard rock miner, and an initiator of the local concerned citizens group, he was delighted at this turn of events. “I’m so happy I lived to see this day,” he told me. However, he went on to express some concern that the current generation of Canadian nuclear people might come back for a second try if they fail to find the “willing” host they are currently seeking elsewhere in Canada.
Apparently, the deep hole was only capped, not filled in and sealed with rock as we had been given to believe it would be, back in the 1980's. Furthermore, according to an article in the Winnipeg Free Press on December 8, 2010, Paul Thompson, geotechnical science and engineering branch manager with AECL said that despite its closure, research at the site will continue and that they will be watching how well a huge man-made "seal" installed in the interior of the shaft works to keep two water aquifers forever separate. According to the article “The seal is built of highly compacted clay sandwiched between two massive concrete plugs.”
Thompson was quoted as saying "Basically, it's resembling what we would imagine a seal would be at a (nuclear waste) repository if we were ever to build a repository," Thompson said.
I share George’s pleasure in seeing that underground facility officially decommissioned, and I sincerely hope that the reckless idea of permanent underground emplacement of highly toxic and radioactive spent nuclear fuel never sees the light of day in Canada.
Walt Robbins
January, 2011
Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga
Personal Memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis
Facing Armageddon October brings back grim memories of the Cuban missile crisis. It was unquestionably one of the most frightening events of my life.
Working in a government building in the heart of Washington, D.C., I feared that I, and my family were at ground zero waiting for the beginning of nuclear Armageddon. The Cold war could soon become hot, very hot indeed.
It all started one day in mid-October of 1962, when the media reported that a U.S. spy plane produced photographic evidence of on-going construction of Soviet ballistic missile installations on the island nation of Cuba.
Nuclear tipped missiles were capable of reaching most of the continental United States from that small island in the Caribbean , oh so very close to us.
Apparently, all of this surreptitious Soviet activity had been going on for a month or more. U.S. President John F. Kennedy immediately and publicly demanded that the Soviets dismantle those installations and refrain from bringing any offensive weapons into Cuba..
The Soviet response to that demand was completely negative. The threats and counter threats went on for days, each day seeming like an eternity. Neither side gave an inch. The President announced that he would not permit Soviet ships carrying missiles and equipment to reach Cuban soil, and gave them a deadline to reverse course. But the Soviet ships continued on their course. It was a deadly game of “chicken.”
It was no secret that the U.S. and the Cuban government had not been on friendly terms since its leader, Fidel Castro, overthrew the previous regime and proceeded to take over U.S. companies and other interests operating in Cuba.. The two Communist leaders, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and President Fidel Castro had secretly agreed to place the missiles in Cuba.
Would Soviet and U.S. ships and planes engage in armed conflict off the coast of Cuba in the next 48 hours or so? Were the Cuban installations far enough along to permit a missile launching aimed at Washington?
These, and many other questions dominated my thoughts. An atmosphere of gloom and fear had descended upon the land. The business of government ground to a halt. At home, ears were glued to radios. Most of us did not have access to radio reports at our workplaces, and, of course, the advent of the personal computer age was decades in the future.
I remembered the store that sold battery powered transistor radios just a few blocks from my workplace. At lunch time I joined the long lineup that snaked around the block. The little radio I purchased provided a perverse source of comfort. Now, at least, I had some idea of developments as they occurred. Ignorance was not bliss in this situation. On the other hand, what could I or anyone else do as the two superpowers squared off in the Caribbean? Our kids at school were taught to get under their desks in the event of an attack. A few people had built fully supplied underground air raid shelters. These paltry efforts seemed laughable given the awesome power of nuclear bombs, even more deadly than those used to end world war II in August 1945, after being dropped on two Japanese cities by the U.S. Army Air Force.
(Ironically, I was in the U.S. Army Air Force in August of 1945, trained as a radio-operator in the use of high-speed Morse code. We were awaiting orders to be shipped from the U.S. to the Pacific for the planned invasion of the Japanese mainland–an invasion which became unnecessary as Japan surrendered).
The mood among my four car-pooling colleagues was bleak and tense during our rides to and from work as we awaited the outcome of the military confrontation between the Soviets and U.S. Was there anything we could do to help protect our wives and our children? If we only had some advance warning, maybe we could all get far enough out of Washington to avoid incineration.
We went so far as to check on some rural properties for sale in the hills of West Virginia. Then, happily, on October 28, 1962, the Cuban missile crisis ended, without a bang. President Kennedy informed the U.S public that an agreement had been reached with the Soviet Premier to remove the installations and the weapons in Cuba and return them to Russia. In exchange, the U.S. agreed not to invade Cuba. The Secretary-General of the United Nations would verify that the agreement would be carried out.
As I recall, the U.S. also agreed to remove some of its own missiles located in Turkey, which were in striking distance of the Soviet Union. A collective sigh of relief swept through the land. In the car pool and at the workplace, smiles everywhere. It was a very close call.
But, since that time, I have not been able to forgive Fidel Castro for permitting the Soviets to use Cuban soil as a launching pad for nuclear weapons. Whenever I see him on television, all those horrible feelings from that crisis come back to haunt me. Someday,I would like to visit Cuba, but not before that country becomes a free and democratic nation.
TIPPING POINT
The UN Environment Program (UNEP) and the International Energy Agency-backed Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21) project, declared that, for the second year in a row, the quantity of “newly installed capacity” of renewable energy in Europe and the U.S. outpaced that for fossil fuels and nuclear. The report suggests the same outcome is likely on a global basis by next year.
As reported in the July 15, 2010 Report on Business section of the Toronto Globe and Mail newspaper, the report stated that green energy has “reached a clear tipping point” as the main kind of new electricity supply.
Green energy includes such sources as wind power, solar energy, biomass, geothermal, hydro power, ocean wave and tidal power. Also, energy conservation technology could be considered a major form of green energy.
Of course, it will be many years before the tipping point becomes an overwhelming reality. But the trend is quite clear. A comprehensive system of green energy and conservation alternatives is rapidly developing around the world.
Some countries continue to plan for more nuclear energy projects, e.g., China and Russia and even the U.S. But it can take a decade or more to build nuclear plants, whereas many green energy and conservation projects can be completed in a much shorter period of that time. Also, it is likely that countries now planning more nuclear energy will be unable to proceed with many of their projects for financial, design and safety reasons.
There are many downsides to nuclear power generation. To mention a few, it requires fabrication processes which cause noxious emissions and greenhouse gasses, uses non-renewable and ever more costly uranium deposits with increasing amounts of energy inputs, emits radioactive tritium into the air and water, requires massive public loans and subsidies, contributing greatly to the national debt, is the basis for nuclear weapons proliferation, and a desirable target for terrorism. It is a technology that must have an impossible-to-achieve perfect record of zero tolerance for accidents over an entire reactor life cycle, as there is no safe level of ionizing radiation.
Furthermore, some observers point out that , in the unlikely event that all planned nuclear reactors are finally built, they would contribute little or nothing to global energy supply or to the mitigation of any possible adverse effects of climate change, since they will largely be replacing old decommissioned reactors.
And then, of course, there is the intractable nuclear waste issue. A few countries are still planning to develop permanent underground repositories, such as Canada and Sweden, and likely China. But there is a growing reluctance in other quarters to pursue the permanent underground nuclear waste burial option.
Aside from the fact that the underground burial option is certainly no solution to the waste problem and should not be pursued, the act of challenging and thus slowing the development of nuclear waste repositories has helped to “buy time,” for the expansion of green energy and conservation technology.
Renewable green energy may only be providing a small percentage of the world’s energy now, but the tipping point is great news for all of us who have worked so long to bring about a “paradigm shift” away from nuclear energy and fossil fuel toward a sustainable alternative clean energy future and a much safer and healthier planet.
Walt Robbins
August, 2010
Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga
The Unholy Connection
However, someone should tell him about the elephant in the room; that his encouragement and financial assistance for the development of more nuclear energy in his own country runs directly counter to his weapons-free world vision. (Some of the many negative aspects of nuclear energy have been outlined in my “ downsides ” article).
You cannot build nuclear weapons without first having nuclear energy, which produces the needed ingredients for atomic bombs. The world is already witnessing the frightening linkage between nuclear energy and nuclear armaments in North Korea and Iran. The linkage is clear as is the desire of additional countries to pursue nuclear energy development.
Referring to North Korea and Iran, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated that "Both are countries whose actions contravene their international obligations. Both use violence and intimidation to deprive their own citizens of fundamental rights. Both are serious threats to global security. There is much at stake. If nuclear proliferation leads to the use of nuclear weapons, whether by states or non-state actors, then no matter where the bombs are set off, the catastrophe will be felt around the world." Absolutely! But, Mr. Harper should also be advocating the phase out of nuclear energy, without which nuclear weapons development would not be possible.
Further proliferation of nuclear energy can bring the world even closer to the risk of nuclear bomb making materials falling into the wrong hands. Nuclear energy expansion is likely to increase the already dangerous potential for diversion of nuclear materials to unsavory terrorist groups around the world. The more nuclear facilities–the more opportunities for nuclear terrorism.
And then, there is the unsolved problem of the irradiated fuel waste, which can be diverted to nuclear weapons development. Producing more nuclear fuel waste without a truly acceptable solution for its disposition is really quite unconscionable.
President Obama’s new “Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future.” is now in the process of determining what to do about irradiated nuclear fuel wastes, now that Yucca Mountain, Nevada, has essentially been eliminated as a potential underground repository site.
One option, the reprocessing of nuclear waste, will quite likely be a topic for discussion by the Blue Ribbon Commission.
It is truly amazing how many nuclear energy advocates naively believe that all you need do with nuclear waste is “recycle it.” to pave the way for a nuclear power “renaissance.” This simplistic notion completely overlooks the harsh realities surrounding nuclear waste reprocessing.
Nuclear waste is anything but a nice, clean, green substance that can be recycled like yesterday morning’s newspaper. Lethality and toxicity of this waste as well as its mind-boggling longevity is well known. You cannot simply take the waste and easily convert it into fresh reactor fuel. You cannot cool it off and stick it back into the reactor.
Reprocessing requires that you break up the deadly radioactive waste and extract the elements you need, putting them through an unbelievably toxic “un-green” process to produce some usable fuel for the reactor.
The process is well described by Dr. Gordon Edwards, President of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, CCNR. On his web site he says that “...separating plutonium from spent fuel is a dangerous and a dirty business. First the fuel is chopped up, by remote control, behind heavy lead shielding. These chopped-up pieces are then dissolved in boiling nitric acid, releasing radioactive gases in the process. The plutonium is separated from the acid solution by chemical means, leaving large quantities of high-level radioactive liquid waste and sludge behind. After it has cooled down for several years, this liquid waste will have to be solidified for ultimate disposal, while the separated plutonium is fabricated into nuclear fuel or nuclear weapons.”
As noted by Wikipedia, “reprocessing of civilian fuel has long been employed in Europe, at the COGEMA La Hague site in France, the Sellafield site in the United Kingdom, the Mayak Chemical Combine in Russia, and at sites such as the Tokai plant in Japan, the Tarapur plant in India, and briefly at the West Valley Reprocessing Plant in the United States.”
Yes, some of those countries currently reprocess irradiated nuclear fuel rods. But it is becoming increasingly apparent that the down sides of reprocessing far outweigh any of its perceived advantages.
As Max S. Power (an analyst who worked on nuclear cleanup issues for two decades ), points out, “...in the 1980s, (U.S.) Congress’ Office of Technology Assessment concluded ‘reprocessing&rsquo ; which generates additional radioactive waste streams and involves operational risks of its own, does not offer advantages that are sufficient to justify its use for waste management reasons alone.’”
According to the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, “Reprocessing is the fundamental link between a nuclear reactor and a plutonium bomb.” The Union of Concerned Scientists has noted that “reprocessing would increase the ease of nuclear proliferation.”
Reprocessing is also responsible for considerable radioactive land and water pollution; for example from the British and French reprocessing operations at Sellafield and La Hague respectively. Originating from Sellafield sources, the Irish sea merits the dubious distinction of being called the most radioactive body of water in the world. The Alliance for Nuclear Accountability says that “France's reprocessing plant at La Hague routinely discharges into the English Channel so-called low-level liquid radioactive waste which has contaminated seas as far away as the Arctic Circle.”
Given these proliferation and environmental concerns, I hope that the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission eliminates nuclear waste reprocessing from any serious consideration.
Most importantly, the Commission should recommend that further production of nuclear waste itself be curtailed by the phase-out of nuclear energy, in favor of the many available truly innovative renewable green energy and conservation measures.
Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga
STRAWS IN THE WIND
Canada’s nuclear establishment continues to pursue its goal to achieve the permanent underground burial of irradiated nuclear fuel waste. The industry dominated Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) in its draft work plan for the period 2010 - 2014, expects to find a “willing community” to volunteer to host the first underground nuclear waste dump in Canada.
However, elsewhere, there are now some early signs that the permanent burial option may be losing some of its lustre. For example, in the U.S., former Senator. Pete Domenici, a longtime advocate of nuclear power, recently stated “...that it is time to give up attempts to create a permanent disposal site for the nation's nuclear fuel waste at Yucca Mountain in Nevada.” “Yucca Mountain is political. Everybody knows that." he said in an interview after his speech, "The truth of the matter is, the world has passed by the idea of putting spent fuel rods as hot as they come out of the reactor underground in perpetuity."
In Scotland, Environment Secretary Richard Lochhead said: “The consultation supports our commitment to near-surface, near-site facilities, allowing waste to be monitorable and retrievable with minimal need for transportation over long distances. “Having an out-of-sight, out-of-mind policy is losing support.” Hopefully, Canada, and other countries still pursuing the permanent burial option will be flexible enough to reconsider their approaches and their options.
Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga
The Little Reactor That Couldn't
Back in the late 1950's, ideas for the use of small nuclear reactors for various purposes were in vogue. During that period, when I worked for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, I heard speculation over the possible use of atomic energy to run our autos, heat our houses, lift our rockets to the heavens. Many of these ideas were so wild, they were quickly dropped. However, some small reactors were designed and used for university research projects, medical and industrial isotope production and even nuclear submarine propulsion. Small nuclear reactors can range in power output from less that one up to several hundred megawatts.
More recently, prospects for a so-called nuclear renaissance have revitalized speculation about the design and use of small reactors in Canada. For example, in an interview with CBC News, in February, 2009, Premier Brad Wall said “... he hoped Saskatchewan could play a role developing small reactor technology. He went on to say the provincial government might be able to devote some resources to research and development in that area.” A report by Saskatchewan’s Uranium Development Partnership, (UDP) included an upbeat statement that “because they require little or no refueling and produce both heat and electricity, small reactors could eventually compete with small-scale diesel, oil and gas generation as a power alternative in remote sites.” The report went on to state that, “Saskatchewan has the opportunity to participate in this market by partnering with a commercial technology developer on a demonstration project.”
Ah, but–the history of small reactors in Canada includes some very expensive “lemons,” something that should give pause to anyone seriously contemplating getting into that kind of business. As an example, one of those not so successful small reactor efforts was the SLOWPOKE 3, a brainchild of Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. (AECL).
The Slowpoke became an issue for me in 1986, when I was a spokesperson for the Concerned Citizens’ of Manitoba (CCM.), Canada, a nuclear waste watchdog group. After years of our lobbying, the Manitoba provincial government was poised to pass a bill which would prohibit the burial or long-term storage of high level nuclear waste in the Province. AECL officials were quite upset over the upcoming legislation, one of their concerns being that the bill contained a clause which prohibited the storage of high-level nuclear waste originating from outside the Province for more than seven days. This, according to the AECL testimony, would result in its inability to store the waste from its new "Safe Low Power Kritical (sic) Experiment," (a.k.a. SLOWPOKE) at its Whiteshell, Manitoba based nuclear research station.
The SLOWPOKE 3 was to be a small (10 Megawatt) heat and isotope producing nuclear reactor that AECL was actively marketing around the world, even though it was still in the early stages of untested design. AECL maintained that the pending legislation would force it to set up waste storage facilities elsewhere at additional cost, and that Manitoba would lose "commercial benefits" from the SLOWPOKE 3 program. It appeared that AECL planned to retrieve the waste from all the SLOWPOKE 3 reactors that it expected to sell in Canada, and abroad, and bring it to Manitoba for storage! Nevertheless, the Manitoba legislation was enacted into law.
However, that did not stop AECL from promoting its mini-nuke. I recalled reading an article in the Lac du Bonnet, Manitoba, Leader of June 15, 1982, headlined "Nuclear Furnaces Could Soon Be Heating Your House." It went on to describe the small, unattended, SLOWPOKE reactor which could heat a building and require refueling only once every five years. "Safe Low Power Kritical Experiment!"
It was fascinating that AECL chose to use the word "Safe," to describe its new "baby" reactor. It left me with more apprehensions than I already had about its large power reactors, with the acronym, "CANDU," which lacked that vital word “Safe.” Would they now change CANDU to "SCANDU"? Also, I wondered why the use of the word "experiment." After all, who wants to buy a radioactive "experiment" to heat their community centre or other buildings?
A demonstration 2-megawatt version of the SLOWPOKE 3 reactor began very low-power operation at AECL's Pinawa, Manitoba, Whiteshell research station on July 15, 1987. But well before that small demonstration model was up and running, the Crown Corporation was already actively marketing the non-existent 10 mw version in such places as China, Korea, Europe and Canada's own Northwest Territory.
By January, 1988, AECL had signed a memorandum of agreement with Hungary for a potential SLOWPOKE 3 sale. A May 29, 1986, Winnipeg Free Press article headlined "Radioactive Waste Repository for Manitoba Planned by Agency," really caught our attention. AECL’s idea was to remove spent fuel from each SLOWPOKE 3 reactor every five to eight years. The thirty or forty fuel bundles would be placed in concrete cylinders at its research facilities at Pinawa, Manitoba and Chalk River, Ontario. Eventually, it was reported, the waste would go into the (still non-existent) permanent underground waste repository.
CCM took the position that the Province should not permit storage of SLOWPOKE 3 waste and that (it should) ". . . block the buildup of anything which tends to take us closer to a nuclear waste repository in Manitoba." CCM considered that if AECL started bringing its foreign customers' SLOWPOKE 3 excrement back to Canada, it would be well on the road to the full-scale commercial international radioactive waste dump about which CCM had been warning the public for so many years.
According to the article, Provincial Environment Minister Gerard Lecuyer was surprised by this development and indicated that ". . his initial reaction was one of opposition."
CCM's interest in the SLOWPOKE 3 grew further as a result of another article in the Winnipeg Free Press on July 24, 1987, which reported AECL's Metro Dmytriw as saying that the Corporation had received an initial inquiry about the purchase of one from an interested party in Manitoba. According to that article, Dmytriw also suggested that a SLOWPOKE 3 nuclear reactor might be a replacement for Winnipeg's aging central steam heating plant. The article pointed out that AECL had held no discussions with the city nor did city officials express any interest in the idea at the time.
Other groups had also been criticizing the SLOWPOKE 3. The Montreal Gazette, May 22, 1986, reported Norm Rubin of Energy Probe in Toronto as saying . . .(the idea is) "crazy." Rubin wondered how, in the event of an accident, a hospital or shopping mall could be evacuated, especially since the SLOWPOKE 3 would operate "unattended" for some periods of time. The same Gazette article included similar concerns expressed by Gordon Edwards, President of the Montreal-based Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility. Both Rubin and Edwards pointed to the unsolved nuclear waste problem as a good reason for not proceeding with the development and marketing of the SLOWPOKE 3 nuclear reactor.
Aside from the waste, safety, and economic questions surrounding the SLOWPOKE 3, CCM expressed concern over reactor security. An unattended reactor operating in a small community or a building in a large city could present unparalleled opportunities for anyone who might want to steal high-level nuclear waste. (The design called for spent fuel rods to be stored within each reactor, until removed to some other location.) Other possible acts might include sabotaging the untended reactors themselves, or pumping out the water (which becomes more radioactive as the reactor operates), into a municipal system.
Unforeseen and unanticipated damage and acts of terrorism are a real possibility when one considers the many unstable political situations around the world. Even large power reactors have their security problems. According to the October 2, 1987 Critical Mass Energy Project's newsletter, Public Citizen, in the US, "Dozens of security breaches occurred at nuclear plant sites in 1986. These include vandalism and sabotage directed at reactor operations; use of firearms on plant sites by unauthorized persons; and increasing drug use among nuclear workers." Also, some workers have been found, literally, asleep at the switch.
My personal involvement with the SLOWPOKE, became even more intense when my wife, Phyl, and I moved from Manitoba to Québec, in 1988. We had just arrived at the home of friends in the town of Beebe, in the Eastern Townships of Québec. It was March 15, 1988, and we were on a house hunting expedition. Somewhat tired from the day's journey, which included a six-hour long delayed flight from Winnipeg, and a long drive in a rented car through a heavy snow storm from Montréal, we looked forward to some relaxation and good conversation that evening.
Our friends, however, stood by quietly watching, as we stared incredulously at the March 14 edition of the Sherbrooke, Québec, Record, which was propped up on their dining table. Plastered across the front page was a story about AECL's plan to construct and operate a ten megawatt SLOWPOKE ("Safe Low Energy Critical Experiment") nuclear reactor at the Centre hospitalier universitaire de Sherbrooke (CHUS), the large University Medical Centre located in Québec’s Eastern Townships.
I quickly scanned the story, which someone had leaked to the newspaper, revealing AECL's plan to build the reactor for the stated purpose of heating the hospital. AECL was to own and operate it, and the hospital would pay the heating bill. Most importantly, the reactor, the first of its kind, was planned to serve as a demonstration based on the two megawatt version (which we knew was still nowhere near full power)at the Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment at Pinawa, Manitoba.
"I don't believe this," and "You've got to be kidding," were but a few (printable!) comments made by the two of us, as we read the lead article. Our activities in Manitoba were well known to some of the environmental and peace activists in the Townships area. We had made contact with them during the 1985 controversy over a possible U.S. nuclear waste dump in northern Vermont, very close to the Canadian border. When some of them heard that we were moving into the area, we were asked to join them in dealing with the new-to-Sherbrooke SLOWPOKE 3 issue.
Thus, a short time after our arrival into what we had hoped would surely be a relaxed new start in retirement life, Phyl and I were involved in strategy meetings with peace and ecology groups, a meeting with AECL and hospital officials, news conferences and media interviews. It was as if we had never left Winnipeg. Since my concern about the so-called SLOWPOKE 3 reactor had already started to grow over the past several years in Winnipeg, it seemed somehow appropriate to be involved in this new controversy.
The more I learned about the new mini-nuke, the less I liked it: It would use highly-enriched uranium which must be imported from other countries. It would create high-level radioactive waste, which would contain weapons usable plutonium. It would be marketed anywhere in the world. It would operate unattended for periods of time, leaving it vulnerable to those with malicious intent. Also, it would routinely emit radioactive gasses into the environment. Yet, the plan now was to place such a machine in, of all places, a large teaching hospital, where, as is true of anything else designed by humans, accidents could, and did happen.
When Phyl and I finally moved from Winnipeg, we had put our belongings in storage as we continued to search for a house in the Eastern Townships. As it turned out, we did not find a house we liked before we sold our place in Winnipeg. So, we rented a furnished mobile home in a farming area near the town of Beebe. We brought the essentials for living with us in our camper van which pulled our old 1960s'tent trailer from Winnipeg to the Townships. However, I had packed one box of assorted files on nuclear waste issues in the tent trailer. Now, I am not especially a mystic, but it turned out that one of those files was full of papers on the SLOWPOKE reactor! It contained information which later proved to be very useful in shaping future events. However, it now seemed as if our dream of "peace, quiet and contemplation" in the rolling hills of the Eastern Townships was not to be. [Our histories showed that we were probably never cut out for that kind of a life anyway!] For us, it would be the "Year of the SLOWPOKE."
The minutes of a February 16, 1988 meeting between AECL and the CHUS Hospital Board of Directors include an AECL quote that ". . . an appropriate strategy produces very little public reaction." This time, however, AECL's "appropriate strategy" obviously did not take into account that someone(s) high up within the hospital's staff itself might have more than a few misgivings about the venture and would leak the information to the media.
The Townships Peace Group asked us to attend a May 2, 1988 meeting at the CHUS with hospital officials, AECL representatives, and persons concerned about the SLOWPOKE project. We were already seated at the board room conference table when the AECL contingent arrived. Several AECL officials present from the Pinawa, Manitoba, Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment (WNRE), were visibly shaken when they saw us there. Of course, they did not know that we had very recently moved from Winnipeg to Québec. "What are you doing here?" asked one of them. "We live here." I retorted. I'll never forget the astonished look on their faces. The Robbins, former Concerned Citizens of Manitoba stalwarts, were probably the last two people they wanted to see that morning!
They were no doubt unhappy about the presence of others who also were at the meeting, including Gordon Edwards, well known nuclear critic from Montréal, and Max Krell, a local university professor, (and a very concerned nuclear physicist). The hospital officials and AECL reminded me of a group of kids who had just got caught with their hands in the cookie jar. I imagine that they all realized at that moment, that their "appropriate strategy" might have just gone down the tube!
Although good manners were observed throughout, it became quite obvious that the citizens' representatives were not going to buy in on the proposal. It did not take long for a coalition of peace and environmental groups and other concerned individuals to take shape in the Eastern Townships. The group used the same initials used by the hospital, i.e., the "Coalition CHUS" (Continue Hydro, not Uranium for our Safety, or, in French, Continuer l'Hydro non l'Uranium pour notre Sécurité.)
After the initial flurry of organizational and media activity, Phyl and I settled into a relatively benign role of "behind the scenes" support to the mostly French speaking coalition. But I had one more moment in the spotlight, which Phyl provided for me. She had carefully reviewed the contents of the SLOWPOKE file that we had brought with us from Winnipeg, and had found an amazingly frank, and startling statement by John Hillborn, the inventor of the SLOWPOKE reactor, concerning the possibility of nuclear accidents.
In a June, 1981 paper he co-authored for the Second Annual Meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Society in Ottawa,(AECL document No. 7438), Hillborn said that, "It is now well known that people will accept frequent, small disasters more readily than rare catastrophes." Airplane crashes were used as an example. The paper continued, "Although we may have to endure the legacy of Three Mile Island for many years, a decentralized system of small reactors which effectively eliminates the possibility of a single big accident may have a significant advantage in licensing, insuring, and gaining public acceptance. Eventually the public may accept accidents to small reactors to the same extent that they accept fires, explosions, and airplane crashes, as long as the consequences are not obviously worse. It would be unrealistic however, to expect many communities to welcome nuclear reactors within their boundaries until there are severe regional shortages of gas and electricity."
On June 22, 1988, I read this statement, without comment, at the Coalition's first press conference. The media jumped on it. The following day the quote was used in the lead editorial in the Sherbrooke Record . Hilborn's statement became one of the Coalition's, and the media's favorite items. It was an excellent example of the fact that one of our most powerful weapons against AECL was its own prose. I was not alone in finding Hilborn's statement to be a chilling one, with its assessment of public reaction to "small" nuclear catastrophes. The 1980s witnessed bitter and protracted conflict and public concern over radioactive spills from discarded medical equipment in scrap yards, radioactive soil in housing developments, radioactive materials dropping from space satellites, and missing quantities of plutonium. The fact that there is no safe level of radiation was understood by the public. Increasingly, evidence points to negative health effects from the most negligible levels of radiation. And the public has become aware of the consequences from nuclear radiation in whatever forms and amounts. Even the negative side of natural radiation has become more evident. There is nothing to suggest that the public will, in Hilborn's terms, easily accept "small" nuclear disasters.
Coalition CHUS continued to raise questions about the safety of the reactor. An exchange of correspondence between an official of Canada's Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) and myself, revealed that the so-called "nuclear regulators" had no(!) safety information on the reactor. Their October 5, 1988 letter to me stated that "It is likely that the 10-mw reactor will be significantly different from the (2-mw) SDR." The letter also noted that "At this time the AECB does not have any detailed design information on the proposed 10-mw installation." Not only was the 10-megawatt SLOWPOKE 3 an "experiment" in the true sense of the word, even its supposed prototype 2-mw version, at the WNRE, was still in its embryonic stages. AECB had reviewed that reactor and requested that AECL take a number of significant steps to improve its safety.
As the SLOWPOKE issue developed and the Coalition CHUS quickly grew during the Summer and Autumn of 1988, Phyl and I continued to provide it with advice, moral support, and assistance in developing letters and fact sheets I was absolutely astounded at the energy and the effectiveness of the anti-SLOWPOKE coalition. Something was happening all the time. Meetings, mailings, radio and TV coverage, debates, button and t-shirts sales --- just about every legitimate, democratic, non-violent form of protest and expression was taking place.
By October, 1988, the movement had acquired a life of its own. There were so many media events, activities, and speakers' appearances going on that it was difficult just to keep track of them all. As Coalition CHUS rapidly expanded, Phyl and I continued work in our behind the scenes role to supply information and ideas. For example, in one of her fact sheets Phyl included information about AECL's own stated policy of excluding pregnant women and small children from tours and open houses at the WNRE, which contained the 2 megawatt "prototype" of the SLOWPOKE. Pregnant women and small children visit the CHUS medical centre every day for medical treatment. Would not a ten megawatt reactor at the hospital provide at least equal, if not greater risk?
The point was not lost on the nurses at the hospital. Their union passed a unanimous resolution opposing the reactor, declaring it a public health risk.
By November, 1988, coalition support was estimated at twenty-five thousand, with almost ten organizations a week joining our forces. Much of the opposition came from the hospital staff itself. Politicians were falling over themselves to come onside. The handwriting on the wall was writ large and clear. On December 20, 1988, we received the best Christmas present of all: the hospital Board of Directors announced its withdrawal from the SLOWPOKE project, a decision taken in spite of AECL's initial offer to absorb the five-to-seven million-dollar capital cost.
Coalition CHUS had done its work well. AECL folded its tents and left Sherbrooke. It had lost another round in its struggle to market its mini-nuke. AECL's public relations and sales forces had again failed to convince any community that they had invented the perfect nuclear heating machine; one which they promoted as being inherently safe, and which would operate in the midst of a populated area without negative consequences, for at long as 30 years -- - even though the design of the reactor had not yet been finalized or approved!
Undaunted, the federal Crown Corporation continued to seek a location for a full-scale demonstration SLOWPOKE 3 to enhance the reactor's credibility in the eyes of potential foreign customers. But no one was buying. After two more failed attempts (one at a G.E. plant in Peterborough, Ontario, and another lengthy one at the University of Saskatchewan), the marketing project stalled.
A few years later, the two megawatt "prototype" at WNRE (which had never operated at full strength) was shut down.
By November 1991, and forty-five million dollars later, the entire SLOWPOKE 3 project was consigned to oblivion.
In a 2007 article on “ Nuclear Smoke and Mirrors,” Jim Harding, a retired University of Regina, professor of environmental and justice studies commented on some of the Canadian reactor designs. He wrote that “... the list of botched AECL designs is lengthy. There was the Organic Cooled Reactor in Manitoba, which was an expensive dead end. There was the Candu Boiling Light Water Reactor in Québec, which (without even including design costs) was a $126 million disaster. Then there was the Slowpoke Energy System, for which design work cost $45 million, which didn’t work properly. Next came the Candu-3, for which design work cost $75 million, which no one wanted. And the Candu-9, with design costs still secret, which was a no-go in South Korea. More recently AECL built the Maple Reactor at Chalk River, which threatens to become another technological and financial fiasco since the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) is refusing to even license it for operation”.
The moral of this story is that there is no such thing as an inherently safe nuclear reactor. Those who contemplate going down that road should carefully assess the lessons from the past. If they do so, they might very well choose other, more preferable alternatives.
Walt Robbins
Water, Rocks and Nuclear Waste
HOORAY! We hit water, and lots of it! At two hundred forty feet the pinkish gray granite rock gave way to a reddish color and at two hundred and eighty feet our well "came in." Water was being pumped from the hole at the rate of forty gallons per minute, and had leveled off at a depth of sixteen feet from the surface.
Our eastern Manitoba household would have plenty of clean, cold water. Could there be a veritable labyrinth of rivers and streams underground, running cold and deep, through the ancient Pre-Cambrian rock of the Canadian Shield? The strangest thought of all was that we had tampered with some of the deep secrets of the world below us. Nature was permanently altered and had given to us one of her most valued treasures. For that we were thankful.
While we were well drilling on our property, Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., (AECL), at its nearby nuclear research station, was conducting test drilling as a prelude for an underground nuclear waste research laboratory (URL) in our municipality. It’s officials initially insisted that the granite rock formation in the area had “remarkably few cracks.” However, during the major excavation of the URL during the early 1980's, an extensive water-bearing fracture zone was encountered. Several cracks, including a large fracture resulted in the intake of considerable amounts of ground water. requiring pumps to run continuously.
Probably the most descriptive statement about the wet condition of the URL came from Walter Patterson, when he spoke at a 1986 nuclear waste conference in Winnipeg. Trained in nuclear physics and residing in the UK, he was involved with many aspects of nuclear technology for decades. He visited the URL underground facility in as an advisor to a Select Environmental Committee of the British Parliament. After the visit, the Parliamentarians asked his opinion of the operation. Patterson told the conferees, that for the first time on the entire Canadian trip, "I had to say I had not the faintest idea.. I do not know why they are doing what they are doing: because if this is supposed to be research for an underground repository for final disposal of spent fuel, everybody in the business knows that the one thing you have to avoid is water -- and the place is soaking! Absolutely soaking! Up to here (gesturing) in water!"
My comment to reporters after I visited the URL excavation was “if you plan to go down into that hole, be sure to take your rain boots, an umbrella and a life raft. When you think about nuclear waste going into that wet hole, it gives you the chills.”
Over the ensuing years, our own personal well drilling experience in 1980 has always been in the back of my mind whenever the subject of deep underground “disposal” of irradiated fuel waste comes up. Common sense informs us that ground water can eventually corrode waste canisters and carry lethal radioactive substances into the environment above. Given the toxic nature and longevity of the irradiated fuel wastes created by the operation of nuclear reactors, few would disagree that the presence of groundwater presents a serious problem for the integrity of an underground nuclear waste repository.
And, what about these lethal substances? According to Wikipedia, “Certain radioactive elements (such as plutonium-239) in ‘spent’ fuel will remain hazardous to humans and other living beings for hundreds of thousands of years. Other radioisotopes remain hazardous for millions of years. Thus, these wastes must be shielded for centuries and isolated from the living environment for millennia. Some elements, such as Iodine-131, have a short half-life (around 8 days in this case) and thus they will cease to be a problem much more quickly than other, longer-lived, decay products but their activity is much greater initially.”
Hundreds of thousands and millions of years? It may be easier to wrap your mind around the concept of a billion or trillion dollars! In the U.S., Yucca Mountain, Nevada was chosen as the preferred site for an irradiated nuclear fuel waste repository.
One of the reasons the Nevada location was originally selected was because of its arid, desert location. Yucca Mountain (geologically, a tuff formation) would be nice and dry. Or so it was thought. The October 15, 1994 issue of the Las Vegas Sun, reported that “. . Radioactive water from past nuclear testing has penetrated to layers below the proposed storage site. Scientists studying Yucca Mountain as a place to store the nation's high-level nuclear waste have found evidence that surface water from the days of atmospheric nuclear testing probably seeped to layers beneath the proposed repository site,”
The Department of Energy spokesman, Greg Cook was reported as saying ". . . the finding is obviously of concern to us because ground water intrusion within the repository would make it more difficult to contain for 10,000 years the 77,000 tons of spent fuel from commercial nuclear reactors that the government wants to entomb there." Carl Johnson, a geologist for the State of Nevada Nuclear Projects Agency, which monitors the federal Yucca Mountain studies, said that ". . . the finding means 'at least one very fast pathway' exists for ground water to move from the surface to below the repository site." Johnson said that ". . . samples collected from a bore hole on the southeast side of the repository site, 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, contained tritium and chlorine-36 isotopes, residuals from nuclear weapons testing. That means the water seeped from the surface to a depth of 1,450 feet within the 49 years since the first US nuclear weapons test was conducted in New Mexico and probably since nuclear testing began in Nevada in 1951."
Over the years, billions of dollars have been poured into the Yucca Mountain Project. In 2009 it experienced major cuts to its budget at the hands of the Obama Administration. It’s future as a nuclear waste repository lies in doubt.
The latest Canadian proclamation about the suitability of an underground repository (this one for low and intermediate level radioactive waste) comes from Ontario Power Generation (OPG). Its plan is for a deep geological repository (DGR) at the Bruce nuclear facility near the shore of Lake Huron. In media reports, OPG has stated that "There is a consensus in our research that shows the natural barriers will help protect the repository," and that "The limestone bedrock formations that are there have an extremely low rate of permeability. Also, there is a cap of shale 200 meters (about 656 feet) above the repository area that would act as a protective layer."
That rhetoric is an echo of earlier optimistic “dry rock” expectations. What will they find in the limestone excavation? Based on the URL (granite) experience, and the Yucca Mountain (tuff) one, can we anticipate water logged caverns feeding into Lake Huron?
But the biggest question of all is what will the industry-dominated Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) turn up in its ongoing search for a willing community to “host” a repository for Canada’s irradiated nuclear fuel waste? Even if some community in Canada does volunteer for the “undertaking,&rdquo ; any water found within its underground natural barriers would still be a major deterrent.
“Water, water, everywhere.” It’s been nearly 30 years since the Underground Research Laboratory was excavated and over 20 years since the Yucca Mountain project was started. The time has come to look for other methods to manage irradiated nuclear fuel waste. In the absence of an acceptable solution, the most rational and logical first step is to phase out its production.
Walter Robbins September, 2009
Accelerator Transmutation of Nuclear Waste: Modern Day Alchemy
The idea of permanent underground burial of irradiated nuclear fuel wastes was best summed up by Dave Taylor of the Concerned Citizens of Manitoba organization. Calling it the “Outhouse Solution,” he described the process: “Dig a hole, bury the waste and cover it up.”
But I still have hopes that a truly scientific solution could be found to deal with nuclear waste. Could Accelerator Transmutation (ATW) be that solution?
In the final two chapters of volume III of the Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga (Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga) , as a result of my e-mail contact with several of the key ATW scientific researchers, I included a number of references and comments about ATW technology. I argued that ATW should be investigated sufficiently to determine it's viability as an option for the final and permanent destruction of high-level nuclear waste and weapons grade plutonium. ATW is a process in which long-lived radioisotopes are converted to short-lived ones and inert substances by neutron bombardment using a linear accelerator.
The process was well explained by a Professor Helmut Leeb from the Atomic Institute of the Austrian Universities. “The core concept of transmutation – which was formulated as early as mid 20th century – consists of irradiating the actinides by fast neutrons. The highly stimulated nuclei that are generated this way suffer a fission, which leads to relatively short-lived nuclei, which in turn rapidly disintegrate into stable isotopes. Then, they cease to be radioactive,”
For a variety of reasons, ATW was, for many years, relegated to the backwaters of scientific research. It did not emerge as a popular nuclear waste management option, either inside or outside of the nuclear establishment. The preferred option inside the establishment was (and is) clearly geological isolation.
In 1980, when I became involved in the underground research controversy in Manitoba, it was apparent that the problem of nuclear waste "disposal" had virtually become the exclusive domain of the geo-scientific community. Other scientific disciplines had been relegated to the sidelines. The underground burial advocates took control of substantial public resources and became the principle influence on public policy in nuclear waste generating countries.
Some of the early Canadian reports and studies I read, perfunctorily dismissed non-geological options (transmutation among them), and went on to extol the virtues (as well as to prejudge the success) of permanent geological isolation of nuclear waste.
That the geological option was seized upon by the world's nuclear establishment is easily explained in that it promised a relatively quick fix for the mounting stockpiles of irradiated nuclear fuel waste at the reactor sites. (It also demonstrates the human penchant for fouling ones own nest). The waste would soon be out of sight, out of mind, a situation which could facilitate the development of more nuclear energy. Or so the nuclear establishment thought.
Even the U.S. National Research Council in a 1996 study presented a rather lukewarm analysis of ATW. That study concluded that the state of the art of any transmutation process was insufficient to justify a delay in the opening of the first nuclear waste repository. (That U.S. repository, still under development at Yucca Mountain Nevada in 2009, has not only been seriously delayed anyway, but may never be completed.
As for Canada, the nuclear establishment was not involved with ATW research and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Review Panel on Atomic Energy of Canada’s nuclear waste disposal “concept,” avoided ATW "like the plague."
Not only did the main scientific and nuclear establishments take a dim view of ATW, some of my favourite and most highly respected U.S. nuclear watchdog organizations, rendered rather harsh judgments of the technology. In December, 1999, Amy Shollenberger, senior policy analyst for Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy Project said that The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) "... should not continue to spend money researching the Accelerator Transmutation of Waste (ATW) system because it will not offer a viable solution to the nuclear waste problem facing the United States." In the March/April 2001, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Arjun Makhijani, President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER), citing many scientific and technical problems, suggested that transmutation research had been "driven by political forces intent on propping up the nuclear power enterprise." In a May 24, 2001 statement, Edwin Lyman, Scientific Director of the Washington based Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) said that "implementing DOE's ATW concept would vastly increase the environmental, safety and proliferation risks from nuclear power, cost taxpayers a fortune and almost certainly fail to achieve its primary purpose, which is to simplify nuclear waste disposal.
The U.S. nuclear watchdog groups were, in part, reacting to Sen. Pete Domenici's,(R-N.M.), March, 1999 initiative to breath life into the fledgling ATW program, by securing funds for further research. In FY 1999, in the Energy and Water Appropriation Act, the U.S. Congress directed DOE to conduct a study of ATW and to prepare, a "road map" which would forecast needed research areas, time table, costs and schedule. (As an aside, Domenici, also maintained that ATW could be used for other purposes such as medical isotope production.
This point takes on new meaning in the light of the current (2009) Atomic Energy of Canada isotope disruption fiasco brought about the leakage of heavy water from its reactor at Chalk River, Ontario. My research confirms that ATW scientists often pointed that the process could yield significant quantities of medical isotopes for diagnosis and treatment purposes).
The ATW road map, released November 1, 1999, with considerable international scientific input, described in detail, a five year, $281 million project. By July, 2001, DOE's advanced accelerator application (AAA) grants were being distributed to some of the major U.S. universities. Why, in 1999, did ATW suddenly emerge from it's position of relative obscurity? The simple explanation is that it was now being clearly linked to facilitating the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository program and to the future of nuclear energy.
As stated in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) news release " If ATW technology could be successfully implemented to overcome all technical issues, it could potentially facilitate the long-term management of a repository system." And in the words of DOE official, Dr. Stan O Schriber, "ATW holds the promise of making nuclear power more acceptable to the general populace by minimizing the amount of material that has to be stored in a repository and by reducing the length of time over which a geologic repository must be licensed." (As for the length of time, in one of his reports, Los Alamos scientist Francesco Venneri stated that "The goal of the ATW nuclear subsystem is to produce three orders of magnitude reduction in the long-term radio toxicity of the waste sent to a repository, including losses through processing. If the goal is met, the radio toxicity of ATW-treated waste after 300 years would be less than that of untreated waste after 100,000 years.")
The DOE and the U.S. nuclear industry underground burial advocates have neatly coopted ATW to their own ends. They have concluded that some day they might need it to help them justify and sell Yucca Mountain as well as more nuclear energy development to a skeptical U.S. public.
It seems that the nuclear energy and underground waste burial advocates will stop at nothing to get their waste repository "down and running." Why should the public more readily accept the nuclear garbage dump, simply because it is augmented by a 5 year ATW research project? Suppose the ATW research does not pan out? Then, the repository, full of dangerous nuclear waste and plutonium, would eventually be sealed up with all of the risks that would entail.
Even Canada’s (industry dominated) Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) weighed on the issue. In its final report, it rejected ATW, blithely ignoring some of the facts presented to it by its own consultants. It dismissed the ATW option of transmuting nuclear waste to low-grade or even inert substances because it "...is not yet sufficiently advanced for implementation and long-term management of the residual materials would still be required." It cites a report from French nuclear authorities that "industrial implementation of transmutation cannot be seen until the years 2040-2050 at best."
And yet, NWMO is perfectly willing to wait some three hundred years before a dubious underground repository is permanently closed.
But, in NWMO Background Paper: 6.5 Technical Methods: Range of Potential Options for the Long-Term Management of Used Nuclear Fuel, by Phil Richardson & Marion Hill, Enviros Consulting, it is stated that "It is recognized internationally that the possibility that P&T (partitioning and transmutation) could become a readily available and very attractive treatment option in several decades time, (and) could be a reason for choosing storage rather than disposal." (Italics supplied)
Furthermore, in NWMO Background Paper: 6-1 Technical Methods: Status of Reactor Site Storage Systems for Used Nuclear Fuel, by SENES Consultants Limited, it is stated that the dry storage facilities of irradiated fuel at Canada's nuclear power sites currently have a design life of 50 years and that "...the actual life of dry storage containers is thought to be 100 years or more." Put two and two together, and you have a compelling case for continued on-site storage, with augmented security, coupled with some serious research and development into transmutation technologies, (which to my knowledge, no one in Canada is pursuing).
I've referred to some of the risks of underground burial throughout the first three volumes of the Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga. One of the greatest concerns now, is that reactor-grade plutonium, including that produced by the "burning" of MOX (weapons plutonium) fuel, would be sitting in nice, neat underground vaults, just waiting for extraction by future terrorists, rogue states or other disaffected members of society. Reactor grade plutonium can be used to manufacture a crude but highly destructive nuclear weapon.
Other concerns about a repository include nuclear waste transportation accidents, human intrusion, repository failure and environmental contamination, stemming from a wide variety of possible causes. ATW should not be used as an adjunct to an underground repository program, to help promote future nuclear energy development.
I believe that ATW research should proceed on it's own merits, it's main purpose being a clear determination as to whether or not the technology can safely eliminate weapons grade plutonium and high-level nuclear waste without the need for additional management processes, i.e., underground repositories.
I understand the concerns of the anti-nuclear organizations. I realize that any scenario that removes nuclear waste as a “problem” for the industry could lead to a shift in public perceptions, which would benefit its reactor expansion hopes and dreams.
Perhaps. But I still would prefer to see the waste destroyed rather than buried to the potential detriment of future generations. I like the statement in a 1991 New York Times article on ATW to the effect that there are both skeptics and proponents: The Times quotes Dr. Van Tuyle of the Brookhaven Laboratory who declared that "Transmutation is practical. No one really disputes that," he said. "Of course there are difficulties in applying it to a full-scale operation. But the problem of high-level radioactive waste won't go away. We are obliged to find and implement long-term solutions. We have to think of our remote descendants as well as our children and grandchildren."
Currently, it is difficult to determine just how much progress, if any, is being made on ATW technology. My internet searches in 2008-09 revealed very little contemporary information on the subject.
I know that some work is going on in various universities and laboratories, such as the University of Nevada. But I get the distinct impression that the "hell bent for underground burial establishment" effectively put ATW back on the sidelines, at least for now.
However, times are changing. In the U.S. the Obama Administration has made drastic cuts to the 2009 federal budget for the on-going nuclear waste project at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. It is likely that the U.S. government will re-assess the entire nuclear waste program. Hopefully, it will take a new look at the potential of ATW to deal with the problem of the disposition of irradiated nuclear fuel waste.
Nuclear Summer?
The nuclear establishment’s relationship with the global warming movement
Did the world nuclear establishment instigate the concept of global warming in order to insure its own survival and potential expansion?
Some may think “instigate” is too strong a word. However, the influence of the nuclear establishment on the development and perpetuation of the global warming-climate change movement during the 1980's and 90's to the present, certainly raises some serious questions about its role.
Prior to the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992 and the 1997 Kyoto assemblage, the world’s nuclear establishment was sustained by financial “life supports” from governments and was facing imminent collapse. Since the 1970's, orders for new reactors had all but dried up. Even nuclear engineers were becoming an endangered species resulting from lack of new projects.
During the 1980's, the time was ripe for the nuclear establishment to escalate its efforts to assure its survival and to expand its horizons. Its actions suggest that its strategy was designed to achieve a “nuclear renaissance.” The strategy appears to have coupled the growing world demands for energy with the idea of a human-induced world-wide environmental “meltdown” caused by greenhouse gasses. Nuclear was portrayed by its advocates as the ideal solution to this two-pronged energy and environmental threat.
However, it appears that the nuclear establishment had been working on this project for a much longer period of time.
According to former Australian National Environment Correspondent, Alan Tate, the nuclear establishment has been promoting itself as a solution to climate change for decades.
He points out that its representatives were in abundance during the 1988 climate change convention in Argentina.
"They inundated the international negotiators, including with what appeared to be a number of front groups like Students for Nuclear Power,"
Furthermore, in the UK during the 1970's, nuclear energy interests worked with Margaret Thatcher’s government to use global warming as a way of boosting nuclear power.
A UK News, March 4th, 2007, article recounts a BBC Channel 4 documentary made by Producer Martin Durkin called 'Global Warming Is Lies.’ It depicts how the global warming research drive really began when Mrs. Thatcher gave money to scientists to prove burning coal and oil was harmful, as part of her intense effort to stimulate the growth of
nuclear power.
In the U.S., the eminent scientist, Alvin Weinberg, former Oak Ridge National Laboratory Director, and others involved in the early days of nuclear energy, were promoting the idea of nuclear as the future energy source to deal with a potential CO2/global warming problem stemming from the use of carbon-based fuels.
But the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents damaged public confidence in nuclear technology. As well, the unsolved nuclear waste issue was becoming an albatross around the nuclear neck. Thus, global warming became the main rationale for the unpopular nuclear power facilities which were required for nuclear weapons development.
Additionally, to achieve its survival and expansion goals, the nuclear establishment knew it could rely on its long-standing relationship with, and powerful influence on, the world’s scientific community, which it had developed in its early days; during the 1950's and early 60's.
As a middle management level employee in the headquarters of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission for three years in the late 1950's, I had a grandstand seat from which to witness the rapid, almost meteoric rise of the “Atoms for Peace” program and all that it entailed. The public was told that nuclear energy would be “too cheap to meter.”
It was an era of cost plus fixed fee contracts for some of the largest U.S. corporations, as well as the development of lucrative “symbiotic” relationships with broad-based university science and engineering programs. Money was no object. The Eisenhower administration made sure of that. Scientific and engineering disciplines (especially physical, biological, earth, and medical sciences) benefited greatly from the bulging nuclear pocketbook augmented with its massive support from governments.
By the 1980's, it had become very difficult to locate scientists or engineers in virtually any discipline anywhere in the world who would openly criticize nuclear energy. Try to find a scientist today who will lend his or her name to the "no nukes" side of the nuclear energy controversy! A few exist but they are generally blacklisted or worse by the mainstream scientific community and governments around the world.
When I was a spokesperson for the Concerned Citizens of Manitoba (regarding nuclear waste issues) in the early 80's, it was clear that you could count the number of scientific and technical critics on the fingers of your hands. The giant world nuclear establishment had become a major source of employment, professional opportunities, and especially large financial grants for scientific exploration into climate change and global warming. Its’ influence was indeed formidable.
In 1988, an intergovernmental panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was formed under United Nations auspices to study the impact of human intervention on the climate, and by 1997, the nuclear establishment was pushing the global warming envelope to new heights.
According to writer Jeffrey St. Clair,co-editor of the political newsletter Counterpunch, the very well-heeled Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) distributed a packet to the Kyoto convention participants promoting the benefits of nuclear energy to the environment and especially to the global warming issue. Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS) and other environmental groups have been working to block the nuclear establishment’s efforts “...to use the pollution trading credit scheme in the Kyoto climate change agreement to offset nuclear energy’s oppressive construction costs.”
While most environmentalists involved in the Kyoto process did not embrace nuclear as a “green” technology, others actually slipped into the nuclear camp, such as Greenpeace co-founder Patrick Moore. I find it disheartening that any environmentalist would advocate nuclear energy as solution to anything, but, unhappily, some have. But the battle goes on. During the December 2008 United Nations Framework Convention in Poznan, Poland some church and women’s groups admirably continued the fight to prevent the labeling of nuclear energy as clean and green.
One of the most hawkish friends of the nuclear establishment’s future and, especially, its environmental role, is global warming guru, former U.S. Vice President, Al Gore.
Jeffery St. Clair describes the aggressive nuclear establishment lobbying effort directed at the U.S. government noting “...a long and profitable relationship with both Clinton and Gore.” He goes on to say that “...Al Gore, who wrote of the potential green virtues of nuclear power in his book Earth in the Balance, earned his stripes as a congressman protecting the interests of two of the nuclear industry's most problematic enterprises, the TVA and the Oak Ridge Labs.”
In October, 2000, NIRS pointed out that “unfortunately, the Clinton/Gore Administration is not only willing to include nuclear power in the Kyoto process, but to allow it equal status and credits with renewable energy”
Although, currently, the former Vice President tends to understate the future role of nuclear energy in dealing with the climate change-global warming issue, I seriously doubt that his true allegiance to the future of nuclear power has been diminished..
During my tenure with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, I heard much about the influence and efforts of the political Gore family to promote and develop nuclear energy, especially on their Tennessee home turf at the Oak Ridge facility.
“Kyoto targets are reachable now with nuclear energy,” is but one of the many article titles found on the Canadian Nuclear Association web site related to the climate issue. Its reading list is replete with such literature, even to the point of pushing electric car development, (another hoped for nuclear energy sinecure).
The nuclear establishment is pulling out all the stops and is spending a fortune (much of which is taxpayers’ dollars) to tout its energy source as the cure for global warming. And the strategy seems to be paying off, with a significant increase in activity and identification of potential new reactor projects around the world, including North America.
But I do not see references in the nuclear energy propaganda to the fact that large quantities of greenhouse gasses are emitted in the processes of uranium mining, refining and milling required to produce the fuel rods for the reactors. Furthermore, little is said about the irradiated nuclear fuel waste for which no acceptable solution exists.
The big question now, however, is how governments, faced with a severe and deepening economic downturn, will deal with the very expensive nuclear expansion issue.
Unable to stand on its own two feet financially, will the nuclear establishment be able to count on continuing life support from governments, many of which are now committed to the global warming movement? It is too early to answer that question fully, but one sad indication was recently provided by NIRS that “...the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee late on the night of January 27 (2009) snuck in a provision to President Obama's economic stimulus package that would allow as much as $50 BILLION of your dollars to be used as loan guarantees for construction of new nuclear reactors. This would be on top of the $18.5 billion taxpayer dollars already authorized by Congress during the Bush administration.”
Also, many countries have been bamboozled by the nuclear establishment’s lies about its potential to deal with climate change and the world’s energy requirements. With the exception of Germany which still plans to phase out nuclear energy by 2021, a number of European and Asian countries, are in the process of planning a nuclear future.
However, I would not be surprised to see most of these potential projects succumb to a likely long-term economic meltdown and a massive reduction of energy consumption throughout the developed world. After all, these large nuclear projects are extraordinarily expensive, subject to substantial cost overruns and take at least a decade to complete.
In the meanwhile, even without the obscene level of subsidies granted to nuclear from governments, sustainable alternative green energy could still create a paradigm shift in many parts of the world. Hopefully, governments will come to their senses and begin to provide the kind of support needed to really stimulate the green alternatives to nuclear.
However, regardless of what one may think or believe about the issue itself, the most scary thing for me is the mounting evidence of a large measure of “groupthink” among the global warming advocates of the scientific community and the distortion of the meaning of science itself.
Irving Janis, professor emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley, who did extensive work on the subject of groupthink, defined it as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”
Groupthink is particular nasty when found in science. In ancient times, scientific skeptics were sometimes even dispatched to oblivion for their heresies. Today, such skeptics who do not fully embrace the global warming theory are marginalized and even ridiculed by the self-righteous. If they refuse to accept the “truth,” they are even labeled as “deniers,” a term which has a particularly unfortunate connotation.
My understanding of what science is supposed to be all about may be deemed quaint by some. But here it is:
Science is at its best when it openly projects a high degree of skepticism about its’ own findings and conclusions and freely admits that "all is tentative." It is at its best when it deals in a respectful and reasonable manner with those who disagree or have doubts. It is at its best when it serves as an independent arm of society and does not tie itself to special interest groups or to those who have personal or organizational agendas.
Humility is also a virtue for science. For example, the earth and environmental sciences are chronologically in their infancy. Yet, they frequently do not behave that way. It is important to acknowledge this fact and that it is possible that many predictions and computer model forecasts, etc. may not be much more accurate than a coin flip and may turn out to be simply wrong.
Caution and prudence are needed when issuing public statements about potential consequences of scientific findings and conclusions. The very reputation of science is at stake when it takes on the aura of a "new priesthood."
The nuclear establishment itself, also contains many of the classic ingredients of “group think.” As a retired organization development consultant, I have witnessed this phenomenon from the perspective of both the inside and the outside of the establishment.
But I was particularly pleased to discover an item written by a former employee of Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., a nuclear energy advocate, who has some misgivings about the global warming-climate change issue. He is a Mr. JAL Robertson, an excellent writer who carefully analyzes and evaluates this issue. Calling himself “a Kyoto Skeptic, but not a Climate Change Denier” he points out in a January 24, 2007 article in the North Renfrew, Ontario, Times, that “When uncertainties in the (climate change) model are considered, it would be irresponsible to damage the economy for a futile gesture.
Resources would be better spent combating true pollution of air, water and land, that is harming and killing real people who are alive today. I am concerned that when the public realizes that they have been misled they will distrust all scientists ("They told us..."), and not just Kyoto proponents. For the same reason we nuclear advocates should not rely on nuclear energy's lack of GHGs (greenhouse gasses): it has plenty of advantages without having to rely on a dubious one.”
Although I surely do not subscribe to the idea that nuclear energy has “plenty of advantages,” and lacks GHGs, (see my article on "downsides." ). I do completely agree with him that the main priority today is to address the big, immediate killers; air, water and land pollution.
But would nuclear energy make much of a difference in the event that the predictions of the climate change movement materialize? Many observers have pointed out that for a variety of reasons, it is totally unrealistic to believe that nuclear energy, even in massive doses, could make a dent in solving the problem as presented by its advocates.
My own personal view of the climate change issue is: of course the climate is changing; it has ever since the earth was formed and is likely to continue doing so until the “end of time.” As Mr. Robertson indicates, the real issue is, to what extent does human activity affect the climate and, if it does, what might be the consequences?
On that point, I am agnostic.
The “fine hand” of the nuclear establishment in the creation of this global warming movement is far too much in evidence not to raise considerable suspicion in my mind about its legitimacy. My agnosticism also extends to the philosophical position that it is the height of arrogance to suggest that we puny humans really have the power to savage Mother Earth to such a degree (and in such a short time) as predicted by Al Gore and his followers.
For me, the jury is still out!
Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga
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Proposed Radioactive Waste Dump on Lake Huron
An unbelievable proposal by the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) for a deep underground radioactive waste repository a half mile from the shore of Lake Huron is in the works. If the plan succeeds, all of Ontario's “low and intermediate” level radioactive garbage, will eventually be transported to and permanently buried at the site, which is part of the extensive Bruce nuclear complex.
What is low and intermediate? Anything radioactive, from mops and clothing, to reactor tubes and components, is included in the categorization. The "intermediate" level waste requires special handling and can pose risks for significant periods of time. But “low and intermediate” are arbitrary and fuzzy categories based primarily on the types of material and the overall gamma radiation dose rates.
Many observers believe that this is a totally inadequate method for determining the ultimate risks these materials could pose to the environment and especially to human health.. What is needed is a complete inventory of the specific radionuclides and their inherent radio-toxic characteristics and capabilities to do biological harm over specified periods of time.
To the best of my knowledge, no such complete analysis of the elements in so-called low and intermediate waste has been undertaken.
We are told that nuclear reactor fuel waste will not be placed in this facility. But this proposed repository could easily be a “Trojan Horse” for a full scale geological dump for “high-level” irradiated reactor fuel bundles, i.e., the really hot, lethal and incredibly nasty, radioactive stuff! More about that in a moment.
While thinking about this issue, it is important to bear in mind that any amount of ionizing radiation increases cancer risks, as concluded by the U.S. National Academy of Science (NAS) report on radiation risk, (Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation).
When the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) issued its draft Environmental Impact Statement guidelines for this project for public comment, I raised several salient points in my response:
Why, I asked, was the deep underground repository option chosen? The explanation in the proponent’s (Ontario Power Authority’s) original proposal was that "The deep geologic repository is being pursued as the preferred technology because of its greater margin of safety."
It seemed to me that the proponent must explain exactly why an underground facility of this kind would provide a greater margin of safety than the alternatives identified in its proposal. I understand that some other countries such as the Czech Republic and Australia favor near surface engineered facilities for containment and monitoring of low and intermediate level radioactive wastes.
Why would anyone want to construct such a site so near to one of the Great Lakes (Lake Huron)?
Lake Huron is one of the major bodies of fresh water in North America–part of the Great Lakes System. I believe that the proponent should be required to demonstrate why such a facility is to be sited on the shores of this lake. It is possible that any leaking radioactive material from the repository could impact both Canadians and U.S. residents.
I requested that the proponent be required to give a detailed explanation as to why it did not seek an alternative inland underground site which would be clearly outside of the geological zone that could affect the Great Lakes, in order to completely avoid the possibility of radioactive contamination of the lakes.
There should be zero tolerance for the permanent geological emplacement of any radioactive wastes in the Great Lakes basin. It is simply common sense! But the big question for me is:
Could this project be eventually extended to accommodate nuclear fuel waste?
The guideline must deal more directly with the question of the possible future expansion of the proposed facility to accommodate nuclear fuel waste. Simple verbal assurances from contemporary individuals and organizations are meaningless in view of the lengthy isolation time frames required for much radioactive waste and irradiated nuclear fuel waste..
The main questions I raised in my comments are:
Why did Canada’s (industry dominated) Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO), in its final report in 2004, identify the types of rock formations which happen to be present at the proposed Bruce nuclear complex as being suitable for permanent underground storage of irradiated nuclear fuel waste?
Previously, granite rock of the Canadian Shield was considered the preferred host medium.
Why is the limestone rock at the site considered suitable for any kind or level of radioactive waste, given the well-known connection between limestone and underground water sources?
Why, indeed, is this proposal for a radioactive waste repository on the shores of Lake Huron being contemplated at all?
Get involved!
Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga
Nuclear Expansion: Road to Oblivion?
NUCLEAR EXPANSION: THE ROAD TO OBLIVION?
Like the tobacco companies of yore, the nuclear establishment is currently aggressively marketing its dubious products. Most recently, the industry has been bombarding the public with ads to the effect that nuclear energy is clean, safe and environmentally friendly; depicting it as an important tool in dealing with climate change and global warming. Nothing could be further from the truth.
This paper summarizes the downside of expanding nuclear power, which requires processes which cause noxious emissions as well as highly irradiated toxic fuel waste, uses non-renewable and ever more costly uranium deposits with increasing amounts of energy inputs, emits radioactive tritium into the air and water, contributes greatly to the Canadian national debt, is the basis for nuclear weapons proliferation, and is a desirable target for terrorism. It is a technology that must have an impossible-to-achieve perfect record of zero tolerance for serious accidents over an entire reactor life cycle, as there is no safe level of ionizing radiation.
Yes, nuclear energy does boil water which is converted to electricity, that is when not in a shut- down state for frequent maintenance. Yes, there are much safer, cheaper and environmentally friendly alternatives. Yes, our politicians are idiots if they pursue the nuclear option.
Please feel free to use this commentary and the material below to help prevent nuclear expansion and to promote nuclear phase-out along with a rapid increase in safe renewable energy alternatives, conservation and efficiency.
Walt Robbins
March, 2007
Did you know that the nuclear energy is responsible for the release of large quantities of greenhouse gasses and other noxious emissions?
According to a December 14, 2006 report by the Pembina Institute, no other energy source combines the generation of as wide a range of conventional pollutants and waste streams-including heavy metals, smog-and acid-rain precursors and greenhouse gases. It notes that “...total greenhouse gas emissions associated with uranium mining, milling, refining, conversion and fuel fabrication in Canada are estimated at between 240,000 and 366,000 tonnes of CO2 per year.”
Did you know that harmful emissions from the nuclear industry will continue to increase as supplies of rich uranium ore decrease?
According to scientists Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen and Philip Bartlett Smith, “...at the present rate of use, worldwide supplies of rich uranium ore will soon become exhausted, perhaps within the next decade. Nuclear power stations of the future will have to rely on second-grade ore, which requires huge amounts of conventional energy to refine it. For each ton of poor-quality uranium, some 5000 tons of granite that contain it will have to be mined, milled and then disposed of. This could rise to 10,000 tons if the quality deteriorates further. At some point, and it could happen soon, the nuclear industry will be emitting as much carbon dioxide from mining and treating its ore as it saves from the so-called clean power it produces thanks to nuclear fission.” The researchers estimate that “The use of nuclear power causes, at the end of the road and under the most favourable conditions, approximately one-third as much carbon dioxide emission as gas-fired electricity production.”
Did you know that nuclear power production could well go into energy deficit as rich ore quantities are consumed?
According to Energy writer David Fleming in Prospect magazine, “...it would be putting more energy into the process than it could extract from it. Its contribution to meeting the world's energy needs would become negative! The so-called reliability of nuclear power, which its proponents enthuse over, would therefore rest on the growing use of fossil fuels rather than their replacement.”
Did you know that nuclear reactors routinely emit other noxious substances, one of the worst of which is radioactive tritium into the environment?
According to Dr. Gordon Edwards of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, “Tritium poses an ever-present radiological hazard to CANDU (reactor) workers. It is also an environmental contaminant which pollutes the drinking water of many communities situated near CANDU reactors. In addition, atmospheric emissions of tritium are readily inhaled -- and also absorbed directly through the skin -- by residents living near CANDU reactors.”
Did you know that you, the taxpayer, are footing much of the bill and incurring much of the national debt, for Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd’s (AECL’s) nuclear expansion?
According to a recent Energy Probe study, federal subsidies to AECL since its inception in 1952 amount to $74.9 billion of today’s (2006) Federal Government debt (about 12 per cent of the entire outstanding amount).
Did you know that no acceptable solution for the permanent disposition of irradiated reactor fuel waste as yet exists in Canada?
According to the Canadian federal environmental assessment panel (Seaborn) report released in March, 1998 after an eight year intensive public process “... the (AECL) concept in its current form for deep geologic disposal does not have broad public support, and does not have the required level of acceptability to be adopted as Canada's approach for managing nuclear fuel wastes."
Did you know that Canada’s nuclear industry-based Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO, in November, 2005, after a three year study, continued to endorse the permanent underground burial of irradiated nuclear fuel wastes?
According to Elizabeth May, former Executive Director of the Sierra Club of Canada and currently leader of the Green Party of Canada, “...the NWMO has taken its mandate and skewed it to allow them to make decisions that are industry-biased, and not based on health, safety and security measures.”
Did you know that if all of Canada’s current nuclear waste is transported to a centralized location for storage or permanent burial, shipments by rail, highway and waterway, would be continuous, and over many years, possibly decades?
According to Nuclear Waste Watch, ( a network of thirty environmental, social and other groups across Canada) "the potential recipient and transport route communities should all have veto power, and should receive funding from proponents for independent research and community education."
Concerns expressed by many groups opposed to nuclear waste transportation include property value losses along the transportation corridor, the routine radiation exposure during handling and transit, worst case scenario radiation exposure, health and environmental costs, and more potential for accidents and terrorist acts resulting from greater shipment frequency and duration of shipments.
Did you know that no safe level of ionizing radiation exists?
According to a 2005 report of a US National Academy of Sciences panel (Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation--BEIR VII), investigating the dangers of low energy, low-dose ionizing radiation, “..it is unlikely that a threshold exists for the induction of cancers... Further, there are extensive data on radiation-induced transmissible mutations in mice and other organisms. There is therefore no reason to believe that humans would be immune to this sort of harm.”
Did you know that terrorists could use nuclear reactors and nuclear waste as weapons of mass destruction?
According to journalist Jeffrey St. Clair, shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., it was widely reported that al-Qaeda had given serious consideration to crashing commercial aircraft into several nuclear plants on that day. In his September 14, 2002 Counterpunch article (The Fire Next Time), he reports that al-Qaeda operatives Ramzi bin al-Shaibah and Khaled al-Sheikh Mohammad told Al-Jazeera interviewer Yosri Fouda, that future attacks on Western nuclear facilities could not be ruled out.
But the real Achille’s heel at a nuclear plants is the adjacent spent fuel facility, which contains major concentrations of highly radioactive material. They lack the heavy duty containment safeguard provided for the reactor, and could be considered "sitting ducks" for disastrous terror attacks. Large explosions, along with major fire resulting in radioactive release from spent fuel would have serious health, social and economic consequences for people in the surrounding geographical area. It should be noted that many of our nuclear facilities are in close proximity to the Great Lakes. Any ecological disaster resulting from terrorism could affect water quality in both Canada and the United States.
Did you know that more nuclear reactors can lead directly to greater nuclear weapons proliferation?
According to Dr. Helen Caldicott, as a result of the projected “...renaissance of the nuclear power industry, twenty-five countries and consortia will have access over a period of two decades to Generation IV reactors fueled by plutonium.” In her book, Nuclear Power is Not the Answer, Dr. Caldicott reminds us that “Canada supplied India with a CIRUS heavy water reactor for making nuclear energy. . . It was this reactor that gave India the plutonium it used in its first 1974 nuclear weapons test.”
Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga
Nuclear Waste and Terrorism
March, 2006
Shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., it was widely reported that al-Qaeda had given serious consideration to crashing commercial aircraft into several nuclear plants on that day.
According to journalist Jeffrey St. Clair, in his September 14, 2002 Counterpunch article (The Fire Next Time), al-Qaeda operatives Ramzi bin al-Shaibah and Khaled al-Sheikh Mohammad told Al-Jazeera interviewer Yosri Fouda, that future attacks on western nuclear facilities could not be ruled out.
While it is true that nuclear reactors are housed in buildings that are among the most durable modern structures in existence, and have been designed to (hopefully) withstand the force of earthquakes, no one had ever conceived of a direct impact from a large commercial aircraft full of aviation fuel or from some other similar massive explosive assault. Some authorities state that the consequences would be truly catastrophic.
But the real Achilles heels at nuclear plants are the adjacent spent fuel facilities, which contain major concentrations of highly radioactive material.
They lack the heavy duty containment safeguard provided for the reactor, and could be considered "sitting ducks" for disastrous terror attacks. Large explosions, along with major fire resulting in radioactive release from spent fuel would have serious health, social and economic consequences for people in the surrounding geographical area. It should be noted that many of our nuclear facilities are in close proximity to the Great Lakes. Any ecological disaster resulting from terrorism could affect both Canada and the United States.
Unfortunately, none of the discussion papers commissioned by the Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) deals forthrightly and directly with the need to "harden" existing spent fuel facilities at reactor-sites to better protect them from such an attack.
Some of the discussion papers deal with nuclear waste security, but in rather general and overly reassuring terms. These discussion papers are available to the public from the NWMO.
The references to pertinent discussion papers follow my commentary:
Commentary on the discussion documents dealing with the security of nuclear waste:
In my view, the NWMO discussion papers (with the exception of the final one by Ed Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists), do not truly come to grips with the growing threat of extremist Islamic terrorism in the world, and how spent nuclear fuel could be used to further that threat.
Perhaps one reason for this is that Canada, unlike many other countries, has, thankfully, not yet been subjected to these barbaric attacks. Another possibility is that Canadian authorities are actually working on the problem, but prefer to keep their efforts quiet----for security reasons.
In any event, none of these papers directly identify, in any degree of detail, possible kinds of terrorist scenarios and how Canada could develop plans to deal with them. Mostly, the papers hide behind administrative requirements and regulations of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, almost as if somehow the rule book itself provides a wall of protection.
1 Transportation of spent nuclear fuel:
Several discussion papers emphasize that there have been no attacks on spent fuel shipments anywhere in the world. But, some also point out that there have been relatively few spent fuel shipments. If spent fuel is to be moved from reactor sites to any centralized locations, shipment frequency would increase dramatically over decades. It is hard to imagine that such a change would escape the notice of terrorists who are becoming increasingly sophisticated with their information networks and their technology for destructive acts.
Lauding past performance is not a comforting response to the potential threats of the future.
Assertions to the effect that attacks upon spent fuel shipments would fail, or produce very limited negative consequences, or that safeguards in the present security system are adequate, minimize the fact of the rapid advance of destructive technologies now in use or potentially available to those who wish to do us harm. And, as Mr. Bin Laden and his group of religious fanatics has indicated, all of us who are not in his camp, can be considered "infidels" and fair game.
Are contemporary spent fuel transportation casks on trucks or trains sufficiently "robust" to withstand a major, high yield type of attack?
Many nuclear watchdog groups and others, point out that governments have not undertaken the kinds of full scale tests required, and therefore, the question cannot be reliably answered.
As one paper points out, other transported substances might be more easily used by terrorists. Perhaps, but that overlooks the essence of the terrorist mentality and objectives; i.e., to terrorize the public. The large scale psychological impact on the public from damage or destruction of a radioactive nuclear source (as contrasted with any other substance) should never be underestimated.
Any contemplated large-scale, long-time period movement of spent nuclear fuel from reactor sites to some centralized storage or repository site, is, for me, truly a "non-starter." Furthermore, I am fully confident that communities along nuclear waste transportation routes would veto any such plan.
2 Security of the storage options themselves:
In spite of the reassuring words about security of the various options in some of the above cited discussion papers, no concrete evidence has been presented that any one of the nuclear waste management options is really secure from large scale terrorist attacks. The onus has been placed upon current regulatory standards which were produced for a bygone age.
Nowhere (with the exception of Ed Lyman's paper) have some of the key technical issues surrounding terrorism even been identified. Nowhere in these papers has the central issue of the need for securing and "hardening" on-reactor-site storage facilities against contemporary terrorist methodology, been addressed.
As long as the reactors are operating, there will always be about a ten year (cooling off) inventory of high-level nuclear waste at the reactor sites, even if the older waste is moved somewhere else.
The technical problems surrounding the security of that on-site waste must be addressed. That they have not been adequately addressed in the NWMO discussion papers dealing with the subject of security, is a very serious deficiency; one which would make any attempt at the selection of a final nuclear waste management option, a dubious exercise at best.
Outside of a general recognition of need, specific security problems and protections for the centralized (above or below ground) storage option were not mentioned. Both a centralized storage facility and an underground repository facility share some of the same security risks; i.e., transportation to them, as well as vulnerability of protracted surface exposure at the destination, including loading and unloading, repackaging, and movement to the final resting place.
Advocates of "permanent" underground burial in a deep geological repository have long insisted that their option is virtually completely secure; from theft, terrorism, accidents, etc. As indicated above, the permanent burial option is still subject to the security risks of transportation and the exposed surface destination. Nor does burial solve the problem of the "hot" waste that must remain at the reactor sites for a decade before being moved.
Can geological repositories really remain secure for thousands, or even hundreds of years? Some scientists think not and suggest that such facilities could become "plutonium mines" of the future.
An underlying premise of the burial concept is that the waste would not only become irretrievable, but the waste repositories themselves, would require "no institutional controls." Given the advance of science and technology, there is absolutely no reason to believe that a sealed-up underground facility would need any fewer institutional controls than an aboveground one. It would be prudent to assume that those in the future who might want to extract the contents of an underground nuclear burial place, will have the capabilities to do so with whatever technologies, and for whatever purposes they may then have.
In any event, by now it should be crystal clear that this "out-of-sight-out-of -mind" approach was not embraced by a public which was confronted with the spectre of permanent geological burial.
Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., (AECL) discovered this in the 1980's while trying to implement such a program in the Canadian Shield rock in Manitoba and Ontario. More recently, media accounts of an NWMO commissioned study (Citizens' Dialogue on the Long-term Management of Used Nuclear Fuel, July, 2004) reported that "Canadians want the radioactive waste from their nuclear reactors stored within reach, not dropped down holes deep into the rocky Precambrian Shield and forgotten. And they don't trust government, industry or existing regulators with the job."
In the U.S., the Commission which studied the circumstances that led up to the tragic events of September 11, 2001, pointed to a "lack of imagination" on the part of the intelligence community.
I note a singular lack of imagination in most of the Canadian NWMO discussion papers that deal with the subject of security and nuclear waste. There is an unmistakable aura of smugness and complacency in some of these writings which I find disquieting.
They convey the message "Don't worry, we have it all under control." Anytime I hear that kind of message on a subject of this gravity--I do indeed worry. And so should we all!
Pertinent Discussion Papers
One discussion paper, numbered 3-3, is under the category, Health and Safety, and entitled the Status of Canadian and International Efforts to Reduce the Security Risk of Nuclear Fuel Waste, (by Science Applications International Corporation).
It is an overview of current security requirements and applications to future management possibilities and includes basic information about how nuclear waste is currently generated and how it is managed in Canada and internationally. It assesses the nature and extent of potential threats against nuclear waste and provides a section on current security measures including a "risk management approach." It also summarizes Canadian and international security requirements, as well as application of existing security regulations in the context of storage, disposal, reprocessing and transportation.
One of its main conclusions is that current storage management as well as future management options meet Canadian and International requirements; that there have been no "credible threats" to the fuel waste and that the present system acts as a deterrent to "...the current crop of potential terrorists."
Several other NWMO discussion papers deal with security of spent fuel transportation:
Number 6.8, under the Technical Methods category is called Review of the fundamental issues and key considerations related to the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, by Gavin J. Carter of Butterfield Carter and Associates, L.L.C.
In its Section 8 (Security Requirements) this paper concludes that transportation of spent fuel "can be managed safely" and is a "low risk activity."
It notes that illegal procurement or attacks on a shipment of spent fuel has never occurred anywhere in the world. International Atomic Energy Agency, (IAEA) in 1972 first published guidelines for physical protection, used by governments in member countries. Its most recent document is INFCIRC/225/Rev.4. (1980) which requires specific arrangements and meeting of defined standards of physical protection for movements of nuclear material.
The paper notes the existing use of armed guards in certain transport situations e.g., plutonium, (or spent fuel through heavy populated areas in some countries).
Some of its main conclusions are that hazardous material is not an appealing target for thieves as it is difficult to handle, and of little financial or practical value; that spent fuel casks are "... too unwieldy to move quickly", etc. ( difficult for someone to steal or to use for a "dirty bomb"). It notes that "...shipments of spent fuel take place relatively infrequently. As for a terrorist attack, the paper asserts that "A large explosive charge would be necessary to breach the containment of the cask. Even if this is achieved, a dangerous disbursement of radioactive materials will not necessarily occur." The section on security concludes with the statement that "... there are many substances being transported much more frequently every day that would be more attractive options for terrorists than spent fuel casks."
Discussion Paper Number 6-6, under the Technical Methods category, is titled Status of Transportation Systems of High-level Radioactive Waste Management, by Wardrop Engineering, Inc.
This paper reviews the status of plans for transport of used fuel in various countries and deals with possible methods of transportation to a centralized storage or underground repository facility in Canada.
This paper observes that "...though large-scale shipments of used fuel are not currently conducted in Canada, it is a distinct possibility in the future."
In its section 6.10, "Transportation Security Plans," it provides a general statement of Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) license and threat assessment requirements. It does identify some of the measures that might be required for security, such as armed guards, escort personnel, and response forces.
In addition to security of transportation issues, several other papers review security aspects of some of the management options themselves.
Discussion Paper 6-1, under the Technical Methods category, is titled Status of Reactor Site Storage Systems For Used Nuclear Fuel, by Senes Consultants Limited
Primarily, this paper reviews methods and plans for on-site nuclear waste storage throughout Canada. Some tangential issues are covered, including Security (in section 3.3).
As is the case with some of the other papers dealing with security issues, it mainly addresses the basic CNSC regulatory framework with a general description of the procedures that must be followed for the security of spent nuclear fuel. Although it does not address the need for further securing or "hardening" of on-site storage against high-impact terrorist threats, it does recognize public concern. It states that during NWMO workshops and discussion groups, in the wake of September 11, 2001, participant comments "...reflected concerns about the security of fuel currently stored at the reactor sites."
Paper 6-3, under the Technical Methods category is titled Status of Geological repositories for Used Nuclear Fuel, by Charles McCombie, McCombie Consulting
This paper provides an overview and assessment of the international status and developments of the underground "disposal" (burial) option for the long-term management of nuclear waste. Much of the paper relates to the safety of this option.
The issue of security as related to the underground burial option (section 4.3) is presented in general terms making the point that "...ensuring that there can be no unauthorised access to these materials, is vital throughout the whole fuel cycle." The paper maintains that security would be enhanced by the implementation of geological repositories, and suggests a global system of a fewer number of such facilities. There is, however, recognition of the larger transportation problems resulting from such a system.
Discussion Paper 6-2, under the Technical Methods category, is titled Status of Centralized Storage Systems for Used Nuclear Fuel, by Mohan Rao and Dave Hardy of Hardy Stevenson and Associates Limited.
In its examination of the centralized storage option, this paper lacks a specific section on the security issue. It does state that since centralized storage systems could have a long lifetime, they should "...include appropriate features that address security and safeguards issues such as proliferation and terrorism by limiting possibilities through which such acts could be carried out."
Two additional NWMO papers deal specifically with the security issue:
Discussion paper 1-4 Guiding Concepts: Nuclear Waste Management in Canada: The Security Dimension, by Franklyn Griffiths, Ignatieff Chair Emeritus of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Toronto
This paper deals directly with the security aspects of nuclear waste management.
It develops the idea of a dichotomy between centralized national security needs on the one hand, and the need to address individual human security needs on the other. So any national security perspective would need to be "enlarged" to involve the public as a whole in discussions. Griffiths maintains that the two perspectives are not entirely compatible when applied to options for nuclear waste management.
He concludes that the NWMO has an opportunity to "make a human security effort to gain support for an agreed approach." Failing that, the Canadian public might embrace the idea of a continued on-site storage option and join in international efforts to explore other alternatives, (.e.g., one or more international repositories, transmutation of long-lived radionuclides).
He also considers that an integrated approach between national and human security could be attempted.
One other paper on security (unnumbered) was provided by the NWMO, titled Comments on "Nuclear Waste Management in Canada: The Security Dimension," by Prof. Franklyn Griffiths." The author of these comments is Edwin S. Lyman, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, D.C.
In his comments on Professor Griffith's paper, Edwin Lyman takes a more narrowly focussed approach to Nuclear Waste security than does Griffith. Lyman considers that the details of the "purely technical aspects" of this issue are more complex than Griffith suggests, and that an understanding of them is fundamental to any nuclear waste management program. Lyman outlines the key technical issues which must be faced and are not being addressed. He is highly critical of the U.S. government's apathetic response to public concerns over nuclear waste security subsequent to the September 2001 terrorist attacks.
He is concerned that the nuclear industry may not be willing to underwrite the large costs of providing the required high level of security needed for public safety.
If that is the case in Canada, he suggests a Canadian public dialogue on questions surrounding the future of nuclear power plants and spent fuel production in the face of increasing terrorist threats.
READ: The Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga:
NO MORE NUKES!!
No More Nukes
To: Ontario Power Authority: “Supply Mix Advice Report” formal comments
February 10, 2006
On a road trip across the United States last Spring, it became increasingly evident to me that an energy revolution is in progress there. It was not just the visibility of the many wind farms that are springing up, or more hybrid cars and various energy saving initiatives. It was the fact that state and local governments along with NGO’s are seriously and actively working to reduce energy consumption and develop renewable alternatives. They are not just talking about it; they are doing it!
Back in the Summer of 2001, widespread blackouts were predicted for energy greedy California. They did not occur and in that period alone, spearheaded by a range of incentives from their state government, Californians reduced their consumption of electrical energy by as much as 5500 megawatts.
I’m sure that Ontario Power Authority (OPA) and the Ontario Government are well aware of the many such developments in North America and around the world. In spite of the fact that some countries, such as China, still opt for the construction of large scale, centralized electrical energy plants of one kind or another, the real trends are in the opposite direction. And even China is starting to look at the new realities of the 21st century.
A decentralized electrical energy system in Ontario would not only reduce the impact of power disruptions, it would increase and spread-out the economic benefits across the province. In addition, failure to adopt clean-coal technology for existing plants to help manage the transition, can only be viewed as myopic.
All of the great advantages of a cutting edge decentralized system of renewable energy and conservation are well documented in the Ontario Clean Air Alliance (OCAA) study which is very critical of the OPA plan, especially as it relates to the possible construction of more nuclear plants.
Nuclear energy is a very expensive way to boil water, as the resulting never-ending debt load carried by Ontarians demonstrates. I hate to think of what another round of that kind of fiscal irresponsibility would bring to all of us.
Ontario is moving away from its historical role as a high-electrical consumption, industrial manufacturing bastion to a very different kind of economy; essentially a knowledge-based, low energy consumption one. As OCAA points out, Ontario’s electricity demand growth has been “moderating” for the last half century.
As for impacts on air quality, nuclear reactors themselves may not produce the various noxious substances in our air, but they do produce high-level radioactive waste which will be deadly to living things for hundreds of thousands of years. In my view, the industry-based Nuclear Waste Management Organization’s proposals are badly flawed. Ultimately, if implemented, they will return us to the late 1970's and early 80's when many Ontario communities were terribly disrupted in a fruitless search for a nuclear dumping ground.
Furthermore, uranium mining, milling and refining processes, with their mountains of hazardous tailings, do contribute to poor air quality. And, it has been estimated that as a non-renewable resource, uranium will not only cost more, but, in time, the amount of energy needed to get it to reactor fuel rod status will likely exceed the energy actually produced by the reactors. Not much of a bargain for society there!
Designing and keeping those reactors running properly and safely requires near “heroic” efforts. Only one bad slip, and the game is over. No other energy technology can make that claim.
Given all the concerns over factors such as costs, safety, security, radiation health, waste management, it is difficult to understand why the Ontario Government and the OPA are so entranced with nuclear energy, an old technology which would be long gone, if not propped up
by enormous public subsidies.
And, given the great importance and high priority of this issue, the current level of consultation undertaken by the Government of Ontario is woefully inadequate. Nothing short of formal public hearings within the scope of provincial environmental laws and regulations are an absolute requirement.
Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga
Ontario: No More Nukes, Please!
No More Nukes To: Ontario Power Authority: “Supply Mix Advice Report” formal comments February 10, 2006
On a road trip across the United States last Spring, it became increasingly evident to me that an energy revolution is in progress there.
It was not just the visibility of the many wind farms that are springing up, or more hybrid cars and various energy saving initiatives. It was the fact that state and local governments along with NGO’s are seriously and actively working to reduce energy consumption and develop renewable alternatives. They are not just talking about it; they are doing it!
Back in the Summer of 2001, widespread blackouts were predicted for energy greedy California. They did not occur and in that period alone, spearheaded by a range of incentives from their state government, Californians reduced their consumption of electrical energy by as much as 5500 megawatts.
I’m sure that Ontario Power Authority (OPA) and the Ontario Government are well aware of the many such developments in North America and around the world. In spite of the fact that some countries, such as China, still opt for the construction of large scale, centralized electrical energy plants of one kind or another, the real trends are in the opposite direction. And even China is starting to look at the new realities of the 21st century.
A decentralized electrical energy system in Ontario would not only reduce the impact of power disruptions, it would increase and spread-out the economic benefits across the province. In addition, failure to adopt clean-coal technology for existing plants to help manage the transition, can only be viewed as myopic.
All of the great advantages of a cutting edge decentralized system of renewable energy and conservation are well documented in the Ontario Clean Air Alliance (OCAA) study which is very critical of the OPA plan, especially as it relates to the possible construction of more nuclear plants.
Nuclear energy is a very expensive way to boil water, as the resulting never-ending debt load carried by Ontarians demonstrates. I hate to think of what another round of that kind of fiscal irresponsibility would bring to all of us.
Ontario is moving away from its historical role as a high-electrical consumption, industrial manufacturing bastion to a very different kind of economy; essentially a knowledge-based, low energy consumption one. As OCAA points out, Ontario’s electricity demand growth has been “moderating” for the last half century.
As for impacts on air quality, nuclear reactors themselves may not produce the various noxious substances in our air, but they do produce high-level radioactive waste which will be deadly to living things for hundreds of thousands of years.
In my view, the industry-based Nuclear Waste Management Organization’s proposals are badly flawed. Ultimately, if implemented, they will return us to the late 1970's and early 80's when many Ontario communities were terribly disrupted in a fruitless search for a nuclear dumping ground.
Furthermore, uranium mining, milling and refining processes, with their mountains of hazardous tailings, do contribute to poor air quality. And, it has been estimated that as a non-renewable resource, uranium will not only cost more, but, in time, the amount of energy needed to get it to reactor fuel rod status will likely exceed the energy actually produced by the reactors. Not much of a bargain for society there!
Designing and keeping those reactors running properly and safely requires near “heroic” efforts. Only one bad slip, and the game is over. No other energy technology can make that claim.
Given all the concerns over factors such as costs, safety, security, radiation health, waste management, it is difficult to understand why the Ontario Government and the OPA are so entranced with nuclear energy, an old technology which would be long gone, if not propped up by enormous public subsidies. And, given the great importance and high priority of this issue, the current level of consultation undertaken by the Government of Ontario is woefully inadequate.
Nothing short of formal public hearings within the scope of provincial environmental laws and regulations are an absolute requirement.
Walt Robbins
Nuke Waste Transport: Horrors Yet To Come!
As I sit here in my home office on the west side of the city of Kingston, Ontario, I can hear the sounds of passing freight trains on one of the main Canadian east-west rail corridors. At this point, the trains pass close to the spot where the St. Lawrence River Seaway widens into Lake Ontario. When all is quiet late at night, I can sometimes hear the faint sounds of the big trucks roaring along the only major east-west four lane highway across eastern Ontario; "the 401." On rare occasions, I can even hear the low, resonant sounds of a ship's horn on the seaway.
If the nuclear industry gets its way, some day soon, highly radioactive and toxic nuclear wastes from reactors in the provinces of Québec and New Brunswick could move along on this and other transportation corridors, heading west toward a yet to be designated central storage or repository site. West, because it is very unlikely that such a central facility would ever be constructed in any of the provinces to the east of Ontario, the province which produces most of Canada's nuclear reactor waste. These shipments will be continuous and over many years, possibly decades.
With the exception of permanent on-reactor-site-storage of spent (irradiated) nuclear fuel, the legislative options under review by the nuclear industry's Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO), must involve the use of these major Canadian transportation corridors; possibly a combination of all three: rail, road and water The heavy casks could not likely be transported by air for some obvious reasons, not the least of which would be the risk of a high impact crash in a populated area, resulting in explosions, fire, and widespread dispersion of the radioactive cancer-causing agents in nuclear waste.
However, past experience suggests that one should never underestimate the willingness (as well as the arrogance) of the nuclear industry to expose Canadians to the risks of air transport of nuclear waste as it did in the year 2000. Although our Campaign STOP (Stop Trafficking of Plutonium) did help prevent test shipments of mixed plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel from the U.S. and Russia from crossing the 1000 Island Bridge near Kingston, Ontario, it was finally flown right over the heads of many of us. The MOX story is chronicled in the 2004 update of The Great Canadian Nuclear Waste Saga on this web site.
As I indicated in my previous commentary on nuclear waste and terrorism, some of the NWMO commissioned discussion papers deal with nuclear waste security in rather general and overly reassuring terms. None of these papers directly identify, in any degree of detail, possible kinds of terrorist scenarios and how Canada could develop plans to deal with them. Mostly, the papers cite administrative requirements and regulations of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, almost as if the rule book itself will provide a wall of protection.
Most of the NWMO information relating to transportation can be found in the following documents, all of which chant the nuclear industry "low risk" mantra: Discussion Paper Number 6-8 is called Review of the fundamental issues and key considerations related to the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, by Gavin J. Carter of Butterfield Carter and Associates, L.L.C. This paper concludes that "There are a number of extensive technical papers that support the conclusion that spent fuel transport is a low risk activity." Discussion Paper Number 6-6 is titled Status of Transportation Systems of High-level Radioactive Waste Management, by Wardrop Engineering, Inc. This paper declares that "...because of the rugged design of the licensed transportation casks in Canada, it is unlikely that an accident would result in a serious release of radioactive material." Discussion Paper Number 6-7 is called Status of Storage, Disposal and Transportation Containers for the Management of Used Nuclear Fuel, by Aamir Husain and Kwansik Choi, Kinectrics, Inc. This paper emphasizes the "rigorous requirements" that must be met by the transportation containers. Not everyone agrees with the rosy risk and consequence assessments outlined in the NWMO discussion papers on nuclear waste transportation.
The NWMO, as an integral part of the nuclear industry, appears to have limited its consulting contracts on this issue to firms which are well versed in "nuke-speak." One could legitimately ask, where are the papers from those who might take a different view of the issue of nuclear waste transportation safety? Internet search reveals that some very serious questions about the safety, security as well as social and economic aspects of transporting irradiated nuclear fuel do indeed exist! Some of the issues they highlight are as follows: . Property value losses along the transportation corridor . Routine radiation exposure during handling and transit . Worst Case Scenario radiation exposure, health and environmental costs . Likelihood of increased transportation accidents resulting from greater shipment frequency and duration. . Need for full-scale testing of shipping cask ability to withstand such extreme events as very high temperature fire, major collisions involving other dangerous goods, or massive terrorist attack from truck bombs or aircraft.
To move nuclear waste on a large-scale basis, in my opinion, would be an irrational act. In the event that such a program is undertaken, it must involve considerable consultation and input from all the communities affected along the selected transportation corridors. The policy statement of the Nuclear Waste Watch, ( a network of thirty environmental, social and other groups across Canada) states that "the potential recipient and transport route communities should all have veto power, and should receive funding from proponents for independent research and community education." In my view, such veto power must be absolute and non-negotiable. But let us hope that cooler heads prevail and affected communities will not be subjected to the concerns and anxiety over continuous shipments of nuclear waste; that the waste will remain in its present locations, hardened against terrorist attacks, that Canada will join in the ongoing international research efforts to render the waste inert and harmless through such processes as accelerator transmutation. The truth of the matter is, that there is no solution to the problem of nuclear waste at this time, and until there is, it would be the height of folly to commit to a long-term, mass transportation program of the kind discussed in the nuclear industry (NWMO) discussion papers. http://www.web.net/~robbins
nuke waste burial
You have got to hand it to the Canadian Nuclear Industry. It doesn't give up easily. Having failed to gain access to a site for a permanent underground nuclear waste dump in the late 1970's and early 80's, it is getting ready to take another kick at the can using its very own Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) as its agent. Presented as a gift to the nuclear industry by the fiercely pro-nuclear Government of Canada , NWMO was created in 2002 under the Federal Nuclear Waste Act. After massaging the issue for the past three years, in its draft final report, Choosing the Way Forward, the NWMO concluded that the growing stockpiles of irradiated nuclear fuel from Canada's reactors should ultimately wind up in a deep rock underground tomb. What a surprise!
NWMO has taken us right back to the late 1970's. There appear to be only two significant changes in the NWMO report as compared with the earlier effort spearheaded by Federal Crown Corporation, Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd.(AECL). The first is an expansion of the kinds of geological rock formations deemed suitable for the dump. AECL initially restricted its dump site search and research to special "plutonic" granite formations. Much scientific hoopla was touted for this choice. But, later, after disrupting many communities in the Canadian Shield in its pluton search effort, AECL announced that a dump could go into any type of granite rock formation. Now the NWMO has gone a step further by including so-called "Ordovician Sedimentary" rock, which can be found in many parts of Canada, including Ottawa, Kingston, and the Bruce Peninsula in Ontario. Such locations are now considered suitable candidates for potential nuclear waste dumps. Such an expansion of potential sites would vastly increase the chances of NWMO finding some needy community willing to sell its soul and its safety to the nuclear industry for big bucks. Seems that science has taken a back seat to the industry which desperately needs to appear to have solved the nuclear waste problem. The new motto should be "Any old rock will do -- just let us in!"
The other change is the establishment of a longer time line for the upcoming effort. NWMO's time frame could extend as far as three hundred years for final closure of an underground dump, whereas AECL thought that goal could be achieved in a much shorter time period.
As with all good bureaucracies, NWMO is taking out a nice long insurance policy on its own survival as an organizational entity.
The so-called "Option 4 'Adaptive Phased Management' (APM)" discussed in the NWMO report is simply a dressed-up version of AECL's original nuclear waste burial program. Option 4 combines elements of the on-reactor site option, the centralized storage option and the underground burial option. In fact, nearly all the elements of APM can found in an October 1978 AECL publication, Management of Radioactive Fuel Wastes: The Canadian Disposal Program, J. Boulton (Editor), numbered AECL-6314. The Boulton report encompassed "Pre-disposal Technologies," including wet and dry storage at reactor sites, as well as the possibility of the need for a central storage facility. That report stated that "A central storage facility could be located at the site of a generating station or at a fuel management site which may also include immobilization and disposal facilities." These "pre-disposal" storage options would be needed for "several decades." The Boulton report goes on to describe the ultimate underground dump in grim detail.
As expected, the NWMO rejected the continued on-reactor-site storage of the waste. Expected, because such a decision could be fatal to the nuclear industry. It would be tantamount to a declaration that there is no solution to the nuclear waste problem (which at present happens to be true!). The industry's efforts to promote more nuclear energy, with the resulting production of more nuclear waste, would undoubtedly meet with more than a little skepticism from the Canadian public if the waste remained at the reactor sites indefinitely. So, NWMO's recommendations are quite in sync with the nuclear industry's current aggressive reactor marketing schemes.
As for other approaches to nuclear waste management, NWMO dismissed the promising option of transmuting nuclear waste to low-grade or even inert substances because it "...is not yet sufficiently advanced for implementation and long-term management of the residual materials would still be required." It cites a report from French nuclear authorities that "industrial implementation of transmutation cannot be seen until the years 2040-2050 at best." And yet, NWMO is perfectly willing to wait some three hundred years before a dubious underground repository is permanently closed.
On this very subject, NWMO simply ignored some of the best information given to it by its own consultants' discussion papers.
In NWMO Background Paper: 6.5 Technical Methods: Range of Potential Options for the Long-Term Management of Used Nuclear Fuel, by Phil Richardson & Marion Hill, Enviros Consulting, it is stated that "It is recognized internationally that the possibility that P&T (partitioning and transmutation) could become a readily available and very attractive treatment option in several decades time, (and) could be a reason for choosing storage rather than disposal."
Damn good reason!
Furthermore, in NWMO Background Paper: 6-1 Technical Methods: Status of Reactor Site Storage Systems for Used Nuclear Fuel, by SENES Consultants Limited, it is stated that the dry storage facilities of irradiated fuel at Canada's nuclear power sites currently have a design life of 50 years and that "...the actual life of dry storage containers is thought to be 100 years or more."
Put two and two together, and you have a compelling case for continued on-site storage, with augmented security, coupled with some serious research and development into transmutation technologies, (which is being pursued in many countries around the world, but not in Canada).
The Canadian Nuclear Industry wants to sell, sell, sell more reactors, and it can't wait several decades for what could turn out to be a real scientific solution for the waste, as contrasted with the crude "out of sight-out of mind" option chosen by its Nuclear Waste Management Organization.
Among other liabilities, the Adaptive Phased Management Monstrosity proposed by the NWMO would put decades of continuous nuclear waste traffic on highways, rail lines, and even seaways - major Canadian transportation corridors; a terrorists' dream scenario!
Finally, during the late 1970s and early '80s, in its search for a nuclear waste dump site, the nuclear industry inflicted a great deal of sociological and psychological damage upon the citizens of many communities throughout the Canadian Shield in Ontario and Manitoba. The NWMO proposal virtually insures that that unhappy chapter of Canadian history will be repeated.
Walter Robbins
January, 2006